The South African
Military History Society

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Krygshistoriese Vereniging



Understanding the Intelligence Community
in the South African Military environment,
with a focus on SA Army Intelligence.

Compiled by Mike Huxtable and Dave Kenny

INTRODUCTION

This article is a broad overview of the Intelligence structures in the SA Military context, a great deal more can be written on Intelligence functions, origin and development for each aspect of each Arm of Service, as well as each category of Intelligence and each unit in the structure. Intelligence does not function on its own, but operates within a political, social and economic environment to meet its mandate, and this cannot be separated from this context when reviewing the evolution of structures and functions over time. The reader is encouraged to delve into this fascinating topic to research the unique history and astounding contributions made by South Africans over the decades.

The current South African National Defence Force (SANDF)as a military organisation has evolved over many decades, spanning back to the Second Anglo Boer War (1899-1903) – in fact, less formal structures can be traced back to the Zulu empire, with Zulu Impi being utilised as scouts for reconnaissance against the British colonial forces.

Prior to the start of the Second Anglo Boer War, President Paul Kruger’s Geheime Dienst was operating under the authority of the then State Attorney Jan Smuts. Although a State Secret Service organisation, its function was primarily to determine the military capabilities and intentions of the British forces, thus can be indirectly considered as the first South African Military Intelligence structure.


     

Most notable in the Intelligence environment during the war was the establishment of the Intelligence Department and the Field Intelligence Department (FID)by the British during the Second Anglo Boer War, the first official tactical intelligence capability development for British Military Intelligence.


     

During the Second Anglo Boer War many Scout Regiments and units were established, utilising woodsmen, hunters, farmers and the hardy men of the land with field experience for tracking to locate and engage the elusive and veld-proficient Boers. Many of these units continued into World War 1 and 2 (WW1/WW2) with great success in battle. Examples of these units are Driscoll’s Scouts, French’s Scouts, Lovat’s Scouts, Colonial Scouts, Neyland’s Imperial Scouts,and Naudé’s Scouts.

Kommandant Danie Theron’s Rapportryers are probably the best-known Boer intelligence unit, along with other Boer scout groups and individuals that were incorporated into the Union Defence Force.

Another significant outcome of the Second Anglo Boer War was the creation of the Boy Scout Movement by Colonel Robert Baden-Powell during the siege of Mafeking, taking advantage of the availability of skilled young boys at a time when soldiers were not available for his reconnaissance requirements. Col Baden-Powell had by then written at least two manuals on Scouting and Reconnaissance for the British military. On this foundation, the British Regimental Scout and Scout Sergeant musterings were implemented in 1905 and utilised until after WW1. This proficiency badge was issued in South Africa and Rhodesia until the 1970s.



Summarising the origins of our Defence Force broadly then, after the end of the Second Anglo Boer War the British and Boer forces combined to create the Union Defence Force (UDF) under control of a British colonial government structure. As such, the UDF largely followed the British military organisational model and development from before WW1, during the inter-war years and into WW2.

The South African Intelligence Corps was established with effect from 1 February 1940 as a unit of the South African Citizen Force, with the British Intelligence Corps being established by Special Army Order 12 of 1940 on 15 July 1940.

As part of the British Commonwealth, South Africa wore the same insignia as the British military, such as the British Intelligence Corps laurel wreath cap badge and shoulder titles. British officers wore silver badges, while other ranks were issued with brass badges.


     


     

Dave Kenny compiled the following section on further early developments:

1 February is the day the SA Intelligence Corps was established. There were prior Intelligence Corps’ established beforehand in WW1 – see ACF list below:



Other versions of the SA Intelligence Corps were to be established later, the SA Military Intelligence Corps on 1 Jan 1968 and SAArmy Intelligence Corps in 1978 or 1980, but 1 February 1940 is the start-date of an Intelligence Corps as we know it.

At the start of WW2 there was a fair amount of Intelligence chaos prevailing in SA with several (competing) structures engaged in the Intelligence business. In 1939 there was a nascent Intelligence Headquarters (HQ) of only four officers: Lt Col Barney Thwaites (Assistant Director Military Intelligence), Maj. J. McGarel Groves, Capt.’s A. Chapman, and G. Makepeace, but this was to rapidly grow to a MI Division of 31 Officers and 42 Other Ranks. Most of the OR’s were Field Security Police / Personnel (FSP) with previous investigative experience in the SAP or Railways – one even had FID experience from the ABW!

Our history is very confusing at the outset because the Int Corps (as in field Int, not MI division int) was created to support the Mobile Frontier Force in East Africa. The East African Intelligence Corps (EA Int C), had been created at the same time and was integrated with the SA Int C with interlocking command structures but separate areas of operation. The combined Int Corps had a total strength of the Corps was 173 “Europeans” and 50 “non-whites”. The total officer strength was 29. There were no officers on brigade level. There were 8 bicycles, 40 motor bikes, 13 cars, one lorry and 12 pistols on strength.

The Corps was to take a more cohesive form during the year, and by December of 1940 the SA Int C consisted of 178 men and 90 officers. See organogram for development of the structures, noting that the Corps was only one part of the overall MI Division.



The main sub-unit within the Corps was a Field Security Section (FSS) and there were a number of these created, both in SA e.g. Durban, Pretoria, Cullinan, Premier Mines, Cape Town, Pmb, EL etc. FSS’s were created in East Africa to protect “Lines of Communication” and to operate with forward units. Later the SA Divisions in Egypt / N Africa and in Italy (e.g. 6 SA Armoured Division FSS) all developed their own FS structures.

South African field intelligence staff developed a good reputation and numbers of them were deployed to special units and tasks all over the Middle East, Mediterranean, and Balkans (and later, the Far East). Others served in the European theatre and with the Royal Marines. Several gravitated to the Special Operations Executive and to special operations with T Force, S Force, Control Commission Germany, Indian Field Broadcasting Unit, No 1. Special Force, and with various Allied Command structures.

Sadly, a number of SA Int Corps members were KIA or KOAS, many in plane crashes or ship sinkings. Numbers were captured at Tobruk and elsewhere, and several of these escaped and joined partisan gangs in behind-the-lines resistance. Many members of the Corps were decorated for their war service and the Corps counted several MBE’s OBE’s, DSO’s, MC’s / MM’s, and MiD’s amongst its members. A disproportionate number of awards for what was a very small number of men.

Sadly, the Corps was to fall foul of immediate post-war politics. Truck-loads of files and records were confiscated by the MP’s and taken away for destruction. The Corps just seems to have faded away.

Dave Kenny continues to do prolific research on South African Intelligence Corps contribution to the international development of the Intelligence Community, as does Col (Ret) Dudley Wall.

Emerging from WW2 into the Cold War era, Intelligence as a capability and function developed in leaps and bounds, aided by massive strides in technology and international co-operation.

It is important here to outline the various levels and categories of Intelligence capability, to help understand the development of the structures they necessitated and for reference going forward.

Role of Intelligence

The purpose of Intelligence is simply to deliver accurate truth in a timely manner, to those with the power to act on it. Intelligence is information that has been processed and analysed to formulate as complete a picture as possible of what is being presented.

Category: Strategic Intelligence
This is the top level of intelligence, providing insights into long-term decision-making and actions regarding the threats to the country or military force. At State-level in South Africa, this function was manged by the Department of Foreign Affairs, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) pre-1994,) and post-1994 by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and South Africa Secret Service (SASS) – later combined to be the State Security Agency (SSA).

Category: Criminal Intelligence
The South African police manage this function, pre-1994 this included counter-terrorism functions that were tasked to the SA Police (SAP) Special Branch, evolving to the SAP Security Branch and then Republican Intelligence, and later the Bureau for State Security (BfSS, known better as BoSS). BfSS evolved into the Department of National Security (DoNS), that became the NIS. In the post-1994 era, national security was allocated to NIA, and the SA Police Service (SAPS) focused on crime with their Directorate of Criminal Intelligence.

Category: Tactical Intelligence
Tactical intelligence defines what is happening on the battlefield – Opponent intentions and capabilities – whether by land, sea, air or cyber environments. It deals with the opponent’s force strength, equipment, tactics, command personalities, location, and movements. Tactical intelligence also covers the geospatial environment – the terrain both own and opponent will be engaging in. To gather information of these various aspects of the intelligence requirement, there are a number of capabilities and functions that are implemented as required:

a. Human intelligence (HUMINT) – This is the deployment of personnel into the field to physically gather information on the opponent by means of observation, surveillance, reconnaissance, tracking and monitoring from concealed locations such as observation posts (OPs). Special Forces (SF) Operators, Infantry Reconnaissance Platoons or Scouts, and Airborne Pathfinder troops can be utilised.

b. Image Intelligence (IMINT) – This is the advantage gained by aerial photography of the opponent and the environment by aircraft such as low altitude single-engine fixed-wing airplanes (Kudu/Bosbok/Cessna/Pilatus, etc), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV/drones), jet aircraft with photo-reconnaissance pods attached (Photo-Recce), high altitude surveillance by jumbo (60 Squadron Boeings) and satellites can provide such images.

c. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) – Opposition force radio signals and electronic communications are intercepted and analysed by foreign language specialist operators.

d. Terrain Intelligence (TERRAIN INT) or Geo-spatial Intelligence (GEOINT) - utilises surveyors and geographic information systems (GIS) to analyse the terrain of the environment in the area of interest, including meteorological data pertaining to weather systems.

e. Cyber Intelligence (CYBERINT) – this is a relatively new development required by the technological advancement that computer systems and networks have brough to the equation.

In the SA Military, each Arm of Service had similar musterings/proficiencies:

SA ArmySA Air ForceSA NavySA Medical Services
HUMINT:
Army Intelligence, counter-intelligence, unit security & Civil Affairs/ComOps, PsyOps

Signals Corps
SIGINT, ELINT & CyberInt

Corps of Engineers
Terrain, Intelligence(ground), survey, GIS and mapping

Special Forces:Infiltration reconnaissance

Infantry Corps:Tracking, scouting by horse and motorbike, observation, recon platoons

Armour Corps:Armoured recon

Artillery Corps:Enemy location by radar

Aerial Recon:
Central Photographic Unit and Photo Recce by Squadrons

Joint Aerial Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC)

ELINT/SIGINT:
60 Sqn

Intelligence proficiency for LS2 members

Air Terrain Int:
Radar and Satellite stations

Musterings for:
Intelligence, Communications Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Radar Operator, Signals, Operational Photography, Survey (SAS Protea) of ocean floor and channels
No official proficiency category, but had capability for Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and ComOps.

Also responsible for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological (NCB) intelligence


           

SA Navy Officers did not wear mustering insignia, but Warrant Officers (WOs) and other ranks wore the mustering insignia on their left shoulder sleeve. Instructors wore the insignia above their left chest pocket.



The focus of the development of intelligence in the military environment leads us to review how these categories and capabilities are employed in South African context. It is necessary to divide this development into the pre- and post-1994 eras, as the social-political environment the military operates requires this. The pre-1994 era had the South African Defence Force (SADF), created after South Africa became a Republic (RSA) on May 31, 1961 under the National Party regime. Evolving from the Union Defence Force (UDF) and British rule, much of the British military heritage was retained. The most notable aspect of this development era is that computer technology was still in its infancy, which largely became more prominent in the post-1994 era when the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was established under the African National Congress regime.

As mentioned earlier by Dave Kenny, after WW2 the South African Intelligence Corps all but vanished. The British managed the intelligence environment via their structures and personnel that were put in place in South Africa. The UDF adopted a posture of defence rather than offence, and the military aspect of society was largely downplayed. However, the changing socio-political environment in Africa was changing rapidly in the Cold War era, with the Communist East-Bloc of the USSR and its alliances pushing into developing economies and influencing violent regime change in particularly African and South American countries. This brought about a change in the southern-African regional perspective of defence, with Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain adopted on 11 November 1965. Angola and Mozambique became involved in their own civil wars, aided by communist Cuban and Soviet-backed forces, after the fall of Portuguese colonial rule in 1974.

South-West Africa (SWA) – now Namibia – was a protectorate of South Africa, to which the South African government did not want to grant independence until all Cuban troops had withdrawn from Angola. SWA was seen as the last barrier to prevent direct military attacks by Soviet-backed military forces against the RSA.

In an interview with Major General ‘Fritz’ Loots while researching the history for the Special Forces Brigade that he established, he mentioned that was brought back from retirement and re-appointed Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) in 1974, having been a Senior Staff Officer at DMI during 1965, and Director of Military Intelligence 1966-1970. When he walked into the Directorate, it was being run by British officers, whom he tells me he promptly had removed from the building. The structure of the DMI is as shown below:





In 1975-76, the SADF launched a covert full-scale conventional attack into Angola, coming within sight of the capital Luanda, before international exposure and pressure resulted in a hasty withdrawal after the United States of America withdrew its support.

Numerous lessons were learned from Operation Savannah, a key outcome being that an offensive position of defence was adopted and the SADF capability was significantly bolstered. One of the shortcomings of Ops Savannah was the lack of a tactical intelligence capability, and over-reliance on international coalitions.



images from https://sadf.info/SADF.html

The SADF was structured into five main Command Sections: