When the Colony of Natal achieved responsible government in 1893, it also assumed responsibility for self defence, and the Militia and Police were accordingly reorganized in 1894-5 for that purpose. The South African War demonstrated the inadequacy of the militia, and a new Militia Act was passed in 1903. This act maintained the Active Militia, comprising units such as the Natal Carbineers, Durban Light Infantry and the Umvoti Mounted Rifles, and established a Militia Reserve, comprising units in the various magisterial divisions of the Colony. By the time of Union the Reserves had become an important component of the Natal Militia, but at the time of the Zulu Rebellion in 1906 they were still in the process of organization and played a very limited role in military operations. (On the organization of the Militia, see Stuart, 1913, chapter III, and Paul Thompson, 2011).
One unit, the Krantzkop Reserves, had been organized by that time and did play a continual if localized role in the second phase of the rebellion, the so-called 'Bhambatha rebellion', which affected the middle Thukela region between April and June 1906. Indeed, at a crucial early moment in that rebellion the Krantzkop Reserves set out to intercept the rebel leader Bhambatha and his followers as they fled from their location in the Umvoti Division across the Thukela into Zululand and found protection in the Nkandla forest there. They came close - a few hours and a few miles - to overtaking the rebel impi near Macala hill on 8 April, and remained in the field with other colonial forces for several days, when, as James Stuart suggests in his magisterial History of the Zulu Rebellion (p 195), they might, with more prescient and decisive leadership above, still have effected Bhambatha's capture and nipped the burgeoning rebellion in the bud.
Current Zulu orthography is used here, except in the case of contemporary official place names, eg Nkandhla instead of Nkandla for the magisterial division and Empandhleni instead of Empandleni; the same applies for Afrikaans names, thus Krantzkop instead of Kranskop.
This is an account of their adventure.
The Krantzkop Reserves
The Militia Reserve as defined in the Militia Act of 1903 consisted of all able-bodied European males not enrolled in Active Militia units. The Reserves were based on existing boroughs and magisterial divisions, and the men eligible for duty were divided into three classes. The First Reserves were unmarried men between 18 and 30 years of age, the Second, married men in that age group and other men between 31 and 40, and the Third, men between 41 and 50. They could be mobilized and attached to field forces just the same as Active Militia units, although the Third Reserves obviously were regarded as more of a home guard. Regulations under the Militia Act had not been gazetted until the end of 1904, and while some headway had been made in modernizing the Active Militia, practically nothing was done about the Reserves. This was partly because the Colony was in economic recession and cutting its military budget, and partly because the Imperial army commander in South Africa and the Governor (who was commander-in-chief in the Colony) were at odds with the colonial government over more pressing matters affecting the Militia organization. These matters were not resolved until the spring of 1905, by which time a new Poll Tax Act portended a violent reaction amongst the African population. The new Commandant of Militia, Colonel Hilmer Bru-de-Wold, foresaw this, and proceeded at once to prepare the Militia, including Reserves, for action.
The first notices for the organization of Reserve units were gazetted and published in the press in November 1905. They announced meetings at various centres to explain the working of the Reserves and to elect officers of units, but it was not until January 1906 that any meetings were actually held. The Commandant started with the magisterial divisions in the north of the Colony, but soon had to turn over the task to the District Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Wales, with the assistance of the resident magistrates of the divisions. When martial law was proclaimed and the Active Militia mobilized on 9 February the process had not even started in the south.
Following an announcement in the Greytown Gazette of 27 January ('Natal Militia'), a meeting was held in the Krantzkop Division on 7 February. It was a Saturday, and the meeting started at 11.00 at the courthouse in the village. Nominations were made beforehand, so the process of elections was simplified. Frederick Evert ('Fritz') van Rooyen, a farmer at Middle Bult, was elected Chief leader of the Krantzkop Reserves. Hermanus Lambertus van Rooyen, not an immediate relation, who farmed at Wonderfontein, was elected leader of the First Reserves; Jacobus A de Waal, a farmer with an address in Greytown , of the 2nd Reserves; and Philip Rudolph Vermaak, of Hartebeestfontein, of the 3rd Reserves. It will be observed that these are all Afrikaans surnames, because the small European community consisted in the main of Afrikaners - 'Dutch farmers', the Governor called them.
Bhambatha's rebellion and flight
Bhambatha, who had been deposed as chief, put himself in rebellion by attacking the government: he seized his successor on 2 April, attacked the magistrate on the following day, ambushed a Natal Police column on the 4th, and established a stronghold in the Mpanza district on the 5th. A combination of Active Militia, local Reserves, and loyal tribal levies, all under the command of Colonel George Leuchars of the Umvoti Mounted Rifles, converged on his stronghold on 6 April, and moved to attack it on the 7th. Bhambatha would not be pinned down; by prearrangement he fled on the night of 6/7 April with between 100 and 150 followers, and sped eastwards to cross the Thukela into Zululand and take refuge in the Nkandla forest (Thompson, 2001, pp 16-19; Thompson, 2004).
His flight was not unanticipated. On 6 April the Resident Magistrate at Krantzkop, Alan W Leslie, sent word to Gayede, the aged chief of the Khabela people, who lived on the right bank of the Thukela downstream from Mpanza, to be on guard and to do all in his power to arrest Bhambatha in the event.
Mpanza is about thirty kilometres west of Krantzkop, and the Krantzkop Reserves were not called on to participate in Leuchars' operation. Nonetheless Chief Leader van Rooyen with about twenty men arranged to go over to watch it. They left Krantzkop an hour before dawn and, just after sunrise at Groen Kop, they learnt that at about five a body of about 100 armed men had passed over the farm into the Khabela location. Evidently Van Rooyen sent a man back to tell the magistrate, and even though his party was mostly unarmed, they continued on and, a little further, learnt that the body was apparently Bhambatha's impi and headed towards the Dimane stream. They immediately returned to the village and informed the magistrate. (Bhambatha's impi was reported to be about 200 strong, with 20 to 30 having rifles, but later to be 100 to 150).
Leslie had wired their earlier news to the Minister for Native Affairs. Now it seemed that the amaKhabela were doing nothing on their own, and he ordered them to arm at once and arrest Bhambatha and his band. This order was sent at the latest at about 11.30. He heard nothing from Gayede. Later he learnt that they had received his order, and assembled about midday 'in a desultory manner' at a point about three miles (4,8 km) behind where Bhambatha was supposed to be, discussed the matter, and then returned to their homes. About five hours later Bhambatha crossed the Thukela.
When he reported at 18.50, Leslie said that he did not expect that Bhambatha's men, who had been reported to look tired and some to be wounded, would get any further than the river that night. Van Rooyen suggested that, if he could get together a sufficient number of men, the Krantzkop Reserves be allowed to follow them up first thing in the morning. His offer was accepted, and the Reserves were ordered to parade at 07.00.
The Boers in hot pursuit
On Sunday, 8 April, the Reserves assembled promptly. They were all volunteers, 54 of them, evidently of all classes. There were some elderly men amongst them. One man had a wooden leg, the point of which was fitted in a jam tin instead of a stirrup iron. They were all well mounted, and, presumably, well-armed. At 08.00 they rode out to find Bhambatha and his men.
It was reasonable to suppose that by this time Bhambatha would have crossed the Thukela and been on his way. Whither? The authorities could only guess. Benjamin Colenbrander, the Resident Magistrate of the Nkandhla Division, had received a telegram at 20.00 the night before that Bhambatha was fleeing and apparently aimed to cross over the Thukela into his division of Zululand, and at 22.00 he had sent messages to the chiefs of the wards on the left bank of the river to turn out their men to resist his entry. But Bhambatha had crossed the river at the Mahlabatini (or Mtambo) drift at about 17.00. The chief Mpumela was apprised directly, and his son, Mlogotwa, arrived at the Nkandhla magistracy at 04.00 in the morning, and informed Colenbrander that Bhambatha and his men were arriving at Ntshelele's kraal, below Kotongweni.
Colenbrander's telegram informing the authorities of this was sent at 09.30, and so the Magistrate and Chief Leader at Krantzkop did not have this information when the Reserves set out that morning. In any case, Van Rooyen did not direct his movement towards the Mahlabatini drift, twenty kilometres to the north. The country was broken and he would have had to make many detours from a direct line, which would have been a complete waste of time: doubtless Bhambatha was across the river - but where was he going? And how fast was the rebel impi moving, for the men must be quite tired by this time? Colenbrander had at first suggested towards Qudeni, which was wrong, and there is no record of Leslie's guess as to the direction. Van Rooyen headed north from Krantzkop, and crossed the river at the Lozeni drift. A Natal Mercury correspondent, writing on 12 April ('Reserves Turned Out'), says that the Krantzkop men 'knew every inch of the affected area', and presumably they obtained information from people along the way, including T S Watton, the owner of the store just across the drift.
The Reserves passed Watton's store, and proceeded northward into the Manyane valley, and began the arduous ascent of Macala, a large, rugged and partly wooded hill. Perhaps it was at this time that three of them decided to go back to Watton's (Natal Mercury, 12 April 1906, 'Krantzkop Reserves in Pursuit'). Socwatsha heard that some of the men crossed at the Elibomvu drift, about fourteen kilometres downstream, but he does not say whether they were coming or going (Webb and Wright, Vol VI, p 88).
Van Rooyen's route was in fact almost perpendicular with Bhambatha's. Bhambatha's men had moved in a northerly direction from Ntshelele's. At first Van Rooyen thought that they were heading for Qudeni, and indeed some stragglers seem to have lost their way and gone to Qudeni, but at some point the impi got onto an old wagon road between the Mfongozi and Nsuzi rivers, and followed it around the north face of Macala, and entered the Chube chief Sigananda's ward about the same time that Van Rooyen's detachment left Krantzkop. There Bhambatha parlayed with one of Sigananda's head men, and his men seem to have, had a good rest. It was some time later, of course, perhaps even several hours, when Van Rooyen's detachment found traces of the impi's movement in that direction. But Cakijana (Sukabekuluma), who had escorted Bhambatha's impi, was staying at his uncle Febana's kraal on Macala when 'the white people' passed.
By that time Bhambatha's impi probably had reached its hiding place in the Nkandla forest, and Van Rooyen's detachment ascended the Nkandla range and bivouacked at Elias Titlestad's store on Ntingwe ridge. At 23.00, Leslie at Krantzkop received a telegram from Colenbrander, stating that the detachment was sleeping at Titlestad's and would move on to the magistracy at Empandhleni at three in the morning - also, that at sunset it had been only 1 ½ miles (2,4 km) behind Bhambatha, who was supposed to be at Macala mountain! A correspondent of the Natal Mercury at Empandhleni wrote the following day, evidently after the detachment had reached the magistracy, that at one time it had been 'within half an hour' of Bhambatha, but the rugged country had concealed him. Ntingwe was in the Dlomo chief Thulwana's ward, and apparently some 'Dutchmen' told some of his people, evidently on the lookout for him, that Bhambatha had gone down the Nsuzi to the Nkandla forest: they could go home now, but should report to the magistrate.
Of course, there was no near encounter, and Van Rooyen's information about Bhambatha's movements added little to what Colenbrander had already received from other sources in the course of the day; however, it did demonstrate what local settlers might do if motivated and led well. It was a matter of timing. The Boers were close enough to leave the impression on Socwatsha, Stuart's trusted informant, who was in the neighbourhood at the time, that they 'had chased Bambata ... as far as Macala' and 'crossed Bambata's track' (Webb & Wright, Vol VI, p 88, statement by Socwatsha).
And here the story - of a missed opportunity - might well end.
Boer and Brit at loggerheads
But the experience of the Krantzkop Reserves in the next few days sheds more interesting light on the early course of this second phase of the Zulu Rebellion, especially on divergence of views between the British and Boer leaders on the spot at Empandhleni.
Colenbrander had a few police attached to the magistracy, and the few Europeans who lived in the district came in, and they all formed a laager at the courthouse that night. At about 06.00 on Monday morning, 9 April, the Krantzkop Reserves arrived. Then men of the Zululand Mounted Rifles, the local Active Militia unit, began to arrive in small batches. Some apparently had left the previous afternoon and had ridden (presumably on the main road between Eshowe and Empandhleni) through part of the Nkandla forest. There were about thirty of them by midday, when the Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand, Charles Saunders, arrived by mule cart, having just visited Dinuzulu at Ulundi. The Headquarters Troop of the Zululand Mounted Rifles, under Major W A Vanderplank, marched at 07.00 from Eshowe, and arrived at Empandhleni that evening, bringing the unit's strength up to 105. Moreover Colonel Leuchars of the Umvoti Field Force was planning to come to Nkandla with his mounted troops, and that morning the Natal Police Field Force under Colonel George Mansel had taken the road to go by way of Krantzkop and the Middle Drift.
Colenbrander and the settlers now felt more secure against a possible rebel dash on the magistracy - but what was Bhambatha doing? The information brought in earlier indicated that he and his men were concealed in a part of the forest in Sigananda's ward. The Commissioner and Magistrate conferred, and despatched an order to Sigananda to turn out his men and capture Bhambatha. If he could not lure him out of his hiding place and seize him, then he should surround the hiding place and starve him out. Hours passed. Meanwhile a telegram was received from Mansel, stating that he would cross the Middle Drift that day and then await instructions. Saunders telegraphed the authorities at 16.20, advising them not to send any more Militia to Nkandla. For the time being Mansel's police field force should remain at the drift and the Zululand Mounted Rifles and Krantzkop Reserves should remain at Empandhleni. At 17.00 that afternoon Sigananda's messengers arrived to say that his tribe had lost track of the rebels and did not know where they were! Saunders and Colenbrander were skeptical. Nonetheless, Bhambatha might be escaping again, as he had at Mpanza, and orders were again sent to chiefs in the surrounding wards to intercept him.
On Tuesday, 10 April, the authorities at Empandhleni received conflicting reports, but it was clear enough Bhambatha had not moved and Sigananda seemed to be making no real effort to catch him. The Commissioner and Magistrate were exceedingly skeptical now, but what could they do? Saunders thought that the heavily wooded and broken country was impracticable for mounted troops. Loyal tribal levies must do the main work. He sent messages in the strongest language to move Sigananda, and ordered the neighbouring chiefs Mpumela and Ndube to send levies to help him search for Bhambatha. By the morning of the 11th, Saunders perceived that Sigananda was at last searching in earnest. In fact he was not; his men were only making a show of it. By evening Sigananda had thrown in with rebels, but Saunders did not know it at the time.
Meanwhile the Militia was marking time (Stuart, 1913, p 195). According to the Mercury correspondent (writing on 12 April, 'Reserves Turned Out') Van Rooyen had met an officer of the Zululand Mounted Rifles at Ntingwe on the evening of the 8th, and they 'consulted' - about what is not stated. It seems highly unlikely that an officer of the Zululand Mounted Rifles happened to be at Ntingwe on the evening of the 8th, but it is possible that Van Rooyen might have talked to Elias Titlestad, the owner of the store at Ntingwe - assuming that Titlestad was there at the time - who was a sergeant in the Zululand Mounted Rifles (see Coghlan, 2012, pp 116, 129).
On 9 April, the correspondent wrote that, before midday, the Reserves would be joined by Mansel's police and together they would operate in conjunction with chief Ndube against the rebels. This report is as ambiguous as the later one, for Mansel's force was still in Natal, marching via Krantzkop for the Middle Drift, and the only other force arriving at Empandhleni on the 9th was the Zululand Mounted Rifles (Natal Mercury, 12 April 1906, 'Krantzkop Reserves in Pursuit').
Stuart states that Chief Leader van Rooyen proposed that they should attack the rebels at once. Major Vanderplank disagreed, saying that the local chiefs had not been ordered to arm. Van Rooyen then 'made other efforts in the direction of aggressive action by European troops', but in vain, and so he left (Stuart, 1913, pp 195-6). The Mercury correspondent ('Reserves Turned Out') is vague: 'By some peculiar direction or error their services were not fully appreciated in Zulu land, and so they returned to their homes disappointed.' This seems to imply that there was friction between the authorities and the Boers, which may have involved more than a disagreement about strategy. According to Socwatsha (Webb & Wright, Vol VI, p 88), obviously repeating hearsay, 'Saunders sent [the Boers] back, saying "I'll catch Bambata. I have plenty of men.'''
The Commissioner and Magistrate may have hoped the Reserves would remain at Empandhleni longer. Stuart (1913, p 189) implies this, but then the Zululand Mounted Rifles coming up to full strength might have obviated retention of the Krantzkop Reserves detachment at Empandhleni. The Mercury correspondent (writing on 12 April, 'Reserves Turned Out') stated that the Reserves 'expected further information from the officer directing the operations', and they themselves 'expected a free hand'. They were prepared to fight for some days, being well mounted and having no transportation. (The reference to transportation may be an allusion to the Natal Police Field Force's relatively long train, which had to be routed through Eshowe and Melmoth to Empandhleni). As late as 11.55 on 10 April the Magistrate at Krantzkop telegraphed to the Minister of Justice (who was in charge of the Militia and Police) that the Krantzkop Reserves at Nkandhla asked to be supplied with gun buckets and bandoliers.
The Commissioner seems to have been unfazed by their departure. He advised Commandant Bru-de-Wold that Leuchars' mounted force should not enter Zululand and the Natal Police Field Force, which had crossed the Thukela at the Middle Drift on the 10th, should not go on. Bru-de-Wold gave the orders accordingly. Saunders thought that the Zululand Mounted Reserves and Natal Police Field Force would suffice where they were to maintain law and order in the district.
Stuart, in his History of the Zulu Rebellion, is scathing in his criticism of Saunders' management of affairs. Stuart assumed - as it were, wrongly - that Sigananda was wavering in his loyalty to the government as late as 11 April, and if the government had thrown in the available forces at its disposal - the Krantzkop Reserves, the Zululand Mounted Rifles, and the Natal Police Field Force - to encourage and help him and the other chiefs, then they might have caught Bhambatha.
Stuart says that Van Rooyen advised seizing the initiative by taking aggressive action of some sort. He holds Bru-deWold responsible for not ordering this movement, but then blames Saunders for not providing him with full information and not wishing to unsettle the local Africans by bringing more European troops into the area. Stuart was over-optimistic, rounding off the argument: 'Had the troops converged as suggested, they might conceivably have succeeded in suppressing the Rebellion and saved the Colony over half a million in money', although he concedes this would not have prevented rebellion from occurring later somewhere else. (Stuart, 1913, pp 194-5. He implies that it did not occur to Saunders that stiffening the untrained levies who were supposed to surround and search the forest with some disciplined European troops might make their effort effective).
In this light, it appears that Van Rooyen and the Krantzkop Reserves saw the authorities were dithering and so they went home. The Mercury correspondent at Eshowe ('Reserves Turned Out', 12 April 1906) wrote that they had returned to their homes disappointed, and they planned to hold a meeting at an early date in order to censure the government or the officer responsible! Instead they were assuaged by official praise. As soon as he learnt that they had left Empandhleni, the Minister of Justice telegraphed Leslie to 'convey to them the government's hearty thanks for their prompt and courageous conduct', and to ask Van Rooyen to send a nominal roll to the commandant so that they might be paid for their service at the standard Militia rate.
A danger at home?
There may have been another reason for the sudden departure of the Reserves from Empandhleni. Stuart (1913, p 186) writes that Van Rooyen's detachment left on the morning of the 10th 'to protect the European families at Krantzkop against a possible rising in that part of the country'. He does not elaborate, and one may wonder if such a rising was not the figment of a paranoid settler imagination. (See, for example, Marks, 1970 pp 153-4, 166, and Guy, 2006, pp 21-2, 24).
Yet Ndube's and Gayede's peoples, neighbours across the Thukela, were both disaffected and contributed men to the rebel impi during the rebellion, although their chiefs remained nominally loyal to the government. Gayede's people's passive reaction to Bhambatha's transit on the 7th and the bare suggestion of operations in Ndube's ward by the Mercury correspondent on the 9th, mentioned above, are indicative of a predisposition in the area to rebel.
On 11 April Gayede's. people were summoned to assemble in arms at his Sokoni kraal, about thirty kilometres from the magistracy. They assembled, but the old chief did not address them; indeed; he did not make an appearance at all. The Magistrate sent a policeman along with a local farmer to investigate, but by the time they arrived at the kraal the men were dispersing to. their homes. The policeman made a full report next morning and Gayede himself sent in a report: it was all a false alarm. Some of his people had been having a beer drink by the river when they had heard a call to arms on the Zulu side, and had repeated it on the Natal side. He said that he was trying to find out who had started it. Ndube's men had been assembling on Colenbrander's orders to go and help Sigananda capture Bhambatha, so Leslie had to be satisfied with this explanation. No further record of the event has been found. There is none indicating that the Krantzkop Reserves at Empandhleni knew of it. If the Reserves at Empandhleni somehow got wind of the call-up in Ndube's ward (which actually brought out more rebels than loyalists), and anticipated something similar in Gayede's ward opposite, this could account for their desire to return home on 10 April.
If the Boers acted on such a conjecture, one would assume they would take the easiest, quickest way home, going by the main road from Empandhle'ni to Eshowe to its junction with the road from Krantzkop, just beyond Nkomo hill, and taking the latter' home. They did not do this. Apparently they did follow the main road from Empandhleni and passed through the Nkandla forest where it is of narrow width. But then they left the road and headed in a southerly direction, and arrived on the Krantzkop road just east of the Middle Drift. A shortcut to save time? The detour shortened the distance by road by perhaps ten to fifteen kilometres, but it went through rugged if not trackless bush country. According to Stuart's informants, Nsuze and Socwatsha (Webb & Wright, Vol V p152 and Vol VI, p 88 respectively), they passed over Sisusa hill, then turned off the road to the right, descended Bhobe ridge; passed on to Nkolotshana hill, and worked their way down the left bank of the Nsuzi river. They crossed the tributary Mkalazi stream, rode up to Ntolwana and along the Madangela ridge, and got onto the main road between Eshowe and Krantzkop. There they met and talked with loyalist members of Ndube's Magwaza tribe. Then they proceeded to KwaNdondwana, at the Middle Drift.
The detachment seems to have followed approximately the boundary. between Sigananda's and Ndube's wards. Van Rooyen may have been making a reconnaissance, also perhaps even a demonstration, to put off would-be rebels. A rumour circulated later among the rebels that while Sigananda's men were searching for the rebels, they were fired on by Militia. There is nothing in the government records to substantiate this, but it is not too farfetched to suppose that somewhere along the way one or more of Van Rooyen's detachment may have opened fire for some reason and that some rebel leaders construed it as a provocation. (Quite apart from hearsay statements, see the precognitions of Makolwa, Nkamangana, and Ndabambi, in Volume III of the Colenso Collection in the Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, and the confused statements of Lunyana and Ndabaningi in 'Rex v Sigananda', pp 204-5 and 210, respectively; and compare these to the silence on the subject in Colenbrander's Report, p 15, and Stuart, 1913, p 196).
On the road near the Middle Drift the Reserves met the Natal Police Field Force, which was moving up to the Nkandhla magistracy. The Natal Police Field Force arrived at Empandhleni at about 22.00 on the 12th.
It is not clear whether they bivouacked that night at KwaNdondondwana, by the Middle Drift, or carried on to Krantzkop. The Mercury correspondent at Eshowe speaks of them as being back in Krantzkop on the 12th. By that time the immediate danger of a rising in that vicinity had abated.
The volunteer detachment of the Krantzkop Reserves under their enterprising leader, Fritz van Rooyen, had set out to overtake Bhambatha's rebel impi. They did not know that they were setting out too late, but they moved with speed and purpose through unfriendly, if not hostile, territory, and crossed the impi's track while 'it was still fresh. By this time it was near nightfall and pursuit to the Nkandla forest was out of the question. They pressed on early the following morning to the beleaguered Nkandhla magistracy.
The same aggressive spirit which animated them at Krantzkop evidently animated them at Empandhleni, but again circumstances were not in their favour. Van Rooyen's individualistic style probably grated on the colonial officers in charge, Saunders and Vanderplank, whose coordination of forces against Sigananda and Bhambatha reflected caution and a degree of fear. The possibility of a rising in the Krantzkop Division might well have directed the Boers' attention towards home. In any event they left Empandhleni abruptly, disappointed and probably disgruntled with the results of their enterprise, but at least they received a meed of official praise for it.
'An account of the Zulu Rebellion of 1906: The unofficial report of Benjamin Colenbrander, Resident Magistrate of the Nkandhla Division, Province of Zululand' in Natalia, 35 (2005). The original typescript is in the KwaZulu-Natal Archives' Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository: SNA 1/1/414: 3258/08.
Colony of Natal, The Natal Native Rebellion as told in Official Despatches from January 1st to June 23rd 1906 (Pietermaritzburg, Davis, 1906).
Bosman, Walter, The Natal Rebellion of 1906 (London, Longmans, Green, and Cape Town, Juta, 1907).
Coghlan, Mark, Toujours Pret: The Umvoti Mounted Rifles ... A New History (Durban, Umvoti Mounted Rifles Comrades Association, 2012).
Greytown Gazette, 10 February 1906 'Militia Reserve Meetings'
Guy, Jeff, Remembering the Rebellion: The Zulu Uprising of 1906 (Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006).
Holt, H P, The Mounted Police of Natal (London, Murray, 1913). Marks, Shula, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal (Oxford, Clarendon, 1970).
Natal Government Gazette, No 3515 (1 January 1906); No 3516 (30 January 1906); No 3568A (2 October 1906), Supplement No 16: Govt Notice 592: 'Correspondence Relating to Native Disturbances in Natal'; No 3635A (1 October 1907), Supplement No 17: Govt Notice No 561, 1907 (24 September 1907): 'Annual Report by the Commandant of Militia for 1906'.
Natal Witness, 10 April 1906, 'Krantzkop Reserves in Pursuit'.
Stuart, J, A History of the Zulu Rebellion of 1906 and Dinuzulu's Arrest, Trial and Expatriation (London, Macmillan, 1913).
The Natal Directory Almanac and Yearly Register 1906 (Pietermaritzburg, Davis, 1906).
The Natal Mercury, 10 April 1906, 'Krantzkop Reserves in Pursuit'; 13 April 1906, 'Reserves Turned Out'.
Thompson, P S, An Historical Atlas of the Zulu Rebellion of 1906 (Pietermaritzburg, private, 2001).
Thompson, P S, Bambatha at Mpanza: The Making of a Rebel (Pietermaritzburg, private, 2004).
Thompson, Paul, 'The Natal Militia: Defence of the Colony, 1893-1910,' in Journal of Natal and Zulu History, 29 (2011).
Webb, C de S, and Wright, J S (eds), The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples (6 vols, Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1976-2014).
KwaZulu-Natal Archives' Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository:
Archive of the Colonial Secretary [CSO]: Mgt KK to Minister for Native Affairs, 7 April 1906, 9.30 am, and to SNA, 7 April 1906, 10.50 am; 3040: Mgt Nkandhla to MNA, 8 April 1906, 6.50 pm; Mgt KK to MJ, 10 April 1906, 11.55 am; MJ to Mgt KK, 10 April 1906, 3.30 pm; C147106, 'Interim Report by Commandant of Militia, Natal, on the Native Rebellion'; [Diary] of the Natal Police Field Force; 'Report on the operations of the Umvoti Field Force'.
Archives of the Registrar of the Supreme Court. Special Court: Zulu Rebellion, RSC 111/3/1 (Rex vs Cakijana).
Archives of the Magistrate and Commissioner, Nkandla: 1/NKA 3/2/1/2: 'Report of the Magistrate Nkandhla Division in reply to Circular Commissioner for Native Affairs No 17/1906, SNA Circular No 11/06', 23 July 1906, No 11, Tulwana.
Archive of the Prime Minister [PM]: 102: C225/06; 230105, Synopses 8/9 April 1906, 10/11 April 1906; C230106, Synopses of wires received 7th April, 1906; 8/9 April 1906; and 10/11 April 1906.
Archives of the Secretary of Native Affairs [SNA]: Volume 1/1/339: 1203/1906; Volume 1/11342: 1681/06; Volume 1/11414: 3263/1908, 'Report of the Magistrate Krantzkop, Under Circular 11 SNA 1906'; 1071/06, Mgt Nkandhla [to SNA] 8 April 1906, No 3.
Archives of the Resident Commissioner and Chief Magistrate, Zululand [ZA 23}: 25/07, Rex v Tulwana, evidence of Mcetshwa and statement of Tshonetshone.
Archives of the Registrar of the Supreme Court, Special Court: Zulu Rebellion, RSC 111/3/1 (Rex vs Cakijana), 336, evidence of Cakijana.
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