The South African
Upon mention of 'the Zulu War', most students of
military history tend to associate this dramatic event
with such famous battles as Rorke's Drift, Isandlwana,
and Ulundi, as well as the skirmish on the iJojosi
(Ityotyosi) River in which Eugene Louis Jean Joseph,
Prince Imperial of France and Son of Napoleon III and
the Empress Eugenie of France, met his untimely death.
Very little, indeed, hardly any, mention is made of
two important actions of this War, one of which actually
took place on the same day as Isandlwana and Rorke's
Drift; daily, hundreds of people drive past the
Wombane and Kia Ora with hardly a glance at the
granite cross that marks the site of the battle of
in indlovu. This can undoubtedly be attributed to
the fact that the two sites lie in the heart of Natal's sugar
belt and much of the battlefield has therefore been
ploughed under.
Nevertheless, both are very easy to locate and are
situated within 10 km of one another. Travelling from
Durban to Eshowe, Gingindlovu is reached before
Inyezane but in view of the fact that this battle was
fought before Gingindlovu it is necessary to deal with
the battle of Inyezane first. With this brief background,
therefore, attention is focused upon the activities of the
1st or Coastal Column under the command of Colonel
Charles Knight Pearson, that had invaded Zululand
upon the expiry of the ultimatum, at the Lower Drift
across the Tugela on Sunday, 12th January, 1879.
A large earth-walled fort was constructed on the Zulu
side of the Tugela, opposite Fort Pearson, and named
Fort Tenedos, after the British warship, from the crew
of which part of the Naval Brigade was formed. The
Fort was built under the supervision of Capt W.R.C.
Wynne, R.E., and was large enough to give shelter to the
entire Column in the event that it was attacked.
The Column consisted of the 2nd Battalion of the
East Kent Regt (the 'Buffs'), the 99th Regt (the Duke of
Edinburgh's Lanarkshire Regt), the Naval Brigade
from H.M.S. Active, and H.M.S. Tenedos (the latter
anchored off the mouth of the Tugela), 2 guns from the
Royal Artillery, 2 seven-pounder guns with the Naval
Brigade, a Gatling gun, various local Imperial Units
consisting of the Natal Hussars, the Durban Mounted
Rifles, Alexandra Mounted Rifles, Stanger Mounted
Rifles and the Victoria Mounted Rifles. There were also
some 2 200-odd Natal Natives formed into two
battalions of the 2nd Regt., Natal Native Contingent
and a company of Durnford's Natal Native Pioneer
Corps.
The Battle of Inyezane - 22nd January, 1879, and the Siege of Eshowe
On the 18th January, Col Pearson set out from Fort Tenedos, en route to Ulundi via Eshowe. He spent that night encamped on the banks of the Inyoni River, having made slow progress from the Tugela due to the fact that the rivers and streams were in flood, and it was only possible for one wagon at a time to cross. On the 19th, the Umsundusi was crossed, and on the 20th, the advance party of the column reached the Amatikulu River, the largest since the crossing of the Tugela. Pearson decided to camp there to allow the rest of the column to catch up (some of the wagons were still crossing the Inyoni) and in view of the difficult drift, he ordered Capt Wynne and his Royal Engineers to improve the approaches, and spent the entire day in camp. The column crossed the Amatikulu on the 21st, Pearson making certain that the route ahead was thoroughly scouted. The advance parties reached Gingindlovu*, a military kraal established by Cetshwayo after his victory over Mbulazi at the Battle of Ndondakusuka, in 1856 and so named in commemoration thereof. The kraal was deserted and the soldiers set fire to it. A camp was established nearby, some four miles from the Inyezane River, which was crossed on the 22nd. The Mounted troops under the command of Major P.H.S. Barrow, 19th Hussars, reconnoitred the area across the Inyezane River and informed Pearson that they had found a reasonably flat area where the Column could halt until the wagons had been brought across. The men were given breakfast at this position, below Wombane Hill which formed the right spur of a high ridge that is in the shape of a letter E. These are the foothills of the high range of hills upon which Eshowe is situated. Whilst the troops were resting and the first of the wagons were crossing the Inyezane, some Zulus were observed on the summit of the centre spur and Pearson ordered Lt Reginald Hart, R.E., to take his Company of the Natal Native Contingent up this ridge in pursuit of them. The force set off, the N.N.C. being armed with only ten rifles, half of them obsolete, and the remainder of the troops carrying assegais. Worse still, there was a serious communication gap between the officers and their men, for none of them was able to converse in the other's language.
[*Gingindlovu - 'The place of he who swallowed the elephant' (Mbulazi). The soldiers, unable to master the Zulu language, called it 'gin, gin, I love you!']
Hart's men ascended the hill by way of the track to
Eshowe but before they had reached the top, the Zulus
dropped off the centre spur, moving through a ravine
separating the flanking spurs and reappeared some
distance away on Wombane, the right spur*. Hart left
the track and sent his men crashing through the thick
bush into the ravine, to ascend the right spur, where
they regrouped. At this point, a large Zulu impi
appeared, and Hart's ill-equipped men fled back into
the ravine, scrambling for the centre spur and then the
bivouac.
[*Also known as "Majia's kop".]
It was clear that the Zulus intended attacking the bivouac from the flanks and then overrunning the wagons. They ran headlong into the white officers, and some of the black NCOs still left on the right spur, killing Lts J.L. Raines, G. Platterer and six NCOs, and wounding Lt Webb and one NCO. By the time that the first warriors had reached the foot of the right spur, the rear were still spread out along the crest, and these became the targets of the infantry and the men of the Naval Brigade, the latter under the command of Commander Campbell. Maj Barrow's Mounted Troops now turned their fire upon the head of the impi which had swung right at the bottom of the spur and was closing in on the rest of the Column. They were joined by Capt Wynne and his engineers who, it will be recalled, had been working on the drift. Even before this took place, the guns, under the command of Lt Lloyd were brought into action and poured a devastating fire onto Zulus still on the spur; similarly, the Gatling gun, manned by some sailors under Midshipman L.C. Coker - a 19-year-old with some six years of naval service - was brought into action and sprayed its lethal load over the now hesitant Zulus. Meanwhile, another impi had taken possession of a kraal further up the track on the centre spur, and Commander Campbell, supported by Lt Hart's white survivors, directed his attention to these Zulus, with supporting fire from Lt Lloyd's guns which had ceased firing on the impi on the right spur. This bombardment resulted in the kraal being set alight and in the resulting confusion, the Naval Brigade and one company of 'the Buffs' had little difficulty in occupying the kraal.
The Zulus began to lose heart and, together with those warriors retreating up the right spur, took to their heels, disappearing into the hilly countryside. They had consisted of five regiments, the veteran iziNgulube, the iQhwa, the umxhapho, izinGwegwe, and the inSukamgeni, and totalled some 6 000. They had been commanded by the aged uMatyiya (Majia) and had evidently intended ambushing the column as it crossed the Inyezane drift, using the three spurs of Wombane in a 3-pronged attack. It had been as a result of Lt Hart's foray that the trap had been sprung prematurely, the loins and left horn had been checked, and the right horn on the left spur had not had the opportunity to make itself ready. The Zulus had lost some 350 in the attack, but the impi retreated in good order and was not too badly mauled.
Col Pearson's column halted briefly for the 10 men killed in the battle to be buried (16 were wounded) and continued up the tortuous track, making one more bivouac stop near the summit of the range to allow the forces, which were strung out over a distance of 5 miles (8 km) to regroup. They reached Eshowe on the morning of the 23rd and Pearson chose the Rev. Martin Oftebrow's deserted mission station as a camp site. By the 25th, earthworks had been started according to a plan made by Capt Wynne, and these were completed some days later. The fort was oblong in shape, 200 metres long, 50 metres wide, with 2-metre-high earth walls and surrounded by a ditch over 2 metres deep. The buildings of the mission station were incorporated into the defences.
On the morning of the 25th January, two companies of 'the Buffs' and the 99th Regt escorted 48 wagons out of the fort to collect additional supplies from Fort Pearson. Shortly after they had left, Pearson learnt of the massacre which had taken place at Isandlwana and the death of Durnford who, when Pearson had last heard, was at Middle Drift. This gave Pearson the impression that the Second Column at Jamieson's Drift (some 90 km upstream from Fort Pearson) had been attacked with disastrous consequences, and the realisation that a reportedly massive Zulu force lay between him and Kranskop, together with the thought that there was nothing to stop this impi from invading Natal, suddenly dawned on him. It was only on the 28th that a message was received from Lord Chelmsford in Pietermaritzburg giving details of the disaster that had befallen the Central Column, and advising Pearson to prepare himself for an attack by the entire Zulu army, to strike his tents, and to use the wagons for shelter, if, indeed, he decided to stay at Eshowe at all. In the light of this development, Pearson called a council-of-war and the officers elected to withdraw. However, even while the meeting was in progress, Pearson received a message to the effect that wagon-loads of supplies were close by and that he would then have sufficient stores and ammunition to withstand a major attack or a prolonged siege.
Throughout this period, an increasing number of
Zulus appeared in the vicinity. Pearson began to send
certain unnecessary impedimenta back to Fort Pearson
and on the 29th January, Maj Barrow returned to that
place with all the mounted men and the 2nd Regt,
N.N.C. The countryside was swarming with loose
pockets of Zulus who followed this force back, but made
no attempt to attack. Then, due to lack of grazing within
the confines of the fort, Pearson decided to send back
the more than 1200 oxen (so laboriously acquired by
Chelmsford) and of these, 900 were captured by the
Zulus within an hour of their having left the camp.
Thereafter, in the days that followed, Pearson became
aware that fewer messengers were arriving from Fort
Tenedos and Fort Pearson; but he was still able on the
odd occasion to heliograph back to Fort Pearson from
Mbomboshana, a prominent hill south of his fort at Kwa
Mondi. At this stage he had only some 1300 white
combatants and 400 black drivers and conductors; he
accordingly sent a message to Lord Chelmsford
advising him of his predicament and requesting seven
additional companies of infantry. After a week,
Chelmsford replied that he had no reinforcements
available and that Pearson should withdraw from
Eshowe. From the messages arriving via his runners,
Pearson was fully aware that it would be impossible to
do this in one stage and he requested permission to
withdraw the bulk of his force in stages, leaving a group
small enough to guard the fort and exist on the rations
available. However, this message never reached
Chelmsford, for the Zulus had effectively sealed off all
access and egress to and from Fort Eshowe. For the first
and only time during the Zulu War, the Zulus were able
to pin down a force armed with rifles, guns, and even a
Gatling gun: Eshowe was actually in a state of siege by an
army of warriors, armed for the most part with assegais.
The siege was destined to last for another 2 months,
before Pearson was to be relieved by Lord Chelmsford
and Maj Gen Henry Hope Crealock on the 3rd April.
Details of this period, however, will be described later in
this article.
During the long months of siege, many of the garrison died of dysentery, enteric, and other fevers. There was the occasional skirmish, perhaps the most notable being one that took place on the 13th February, when the Zulu attacking force was pursued as far as the military kraal at Entamedi (Entumeni?). The fort can still be seen, and a large cemetery nearby contains the graves of most of those who died during the siege. The area of Fort Eshowe (also known as Fort Ekowe and Kwa Mondi) is badly overgrown and the graves within the walls have almost disappeared. After the relief, the buildings of the mission station were burnt by the Zulus but were subsequently rebuilt on the adjoining ridge.
The little cemetery at the foot of Wombane is also very badly overgrown but the S.A. War Graves Board has erected a granite cross with the names of those who were killed inscribed thereon, and reburied the dead in a mass grave. To visit this site, turn off to the left of the Gingindlovu / Eshowe road at the foot of the mountain pass, on the farm Morgenster, the owner being listed on the board as Mr Peter Lovell-Shippey. The cemetery is on the right of the old track as it begins to ascend the hill.
Further along the road past Kwa Mondi on Mpondweni Hill is a monument to Macamusela Knyile who was one of the first Christian converts to be shot on the orders of Cetshwayo. The deed was carried out by Nyamalala Zondo on the 3rd March 1877, and the monument is referred to as the Martyr's Cross.
The Battle of Gingindlovu and the Relief of Eshowe 2/3 April 1879
Following the disaster at Isandlwana, plans were
gradually evolved for a second invasion of Zululand
from the lower drift of the Tugela River. Colonial units
were reorganized and in some cases revived. With much
difficulty, oxen and wagons were gradually obtained to
replace those lost up to that date and Lord Chelmsford
even managed to secure the alliance of John Dunn, the
famous trader often referred to in this period of our
history. His official title in his new role was to be Chief of
Intelligence.
Several weeks passed while Lord Chelmsford
prepared for the second invasion; and during this
period he set about his task of preparing for this with
ruthless precision, hampered by an obstinate and
reluctant Natal Government, whose European subjects
viewed his policy of re-arming the Natal Natives, their
ranks reinforced by men of the Natal Native
Contingent, with total disapproval. Meanwhile, Col
Pearson, whom it will be recalled was besieged in
Eshowe, patiently awaited the advance of the relief
column, keeping his men occupied by strengthening
the fortifications which surrounded the Mission Station
at Kwa Mondi and executing the occasional raid on
nearby kraals. It was not long before dysentery began to
take its toll on the men within the confines of the fort
and by the end of March, the food position had become
critical and the draft oxen had begun to replace the
slaughter cattle as a primary source of food. However,
by this time the relief Column had already crossed the
Tugela and was nearing Wombane ridge, and it is at this
point that it is necessary to return to the activities of
Lord Chelmsford.
By mid-March, Lord Chelmsford's preparations for the proposed relief of Eshowe had virtually been completed and he took personal command of this column which once again made Fort Pearson its base. By the 28th March all the troops and impedimenta had been transferred across the flooded Tugela River where Fort Tenedos was similarly used as a headquarters whilst the men were encamped in the area north of the precincts of the fort.
At this stage it is necessary to consider the make-up of this formidable force which consisted of two Divisions, an Advance and a Rear Division. The former was commanded by Lt Col T.A. Law of the Royal Artillery and consisted of two companies of 'the Buffs', five companies of the 99th Regt, and the entire 91st Regt, and, in addition, 350 men of the Naval Brigade.
The Rear Division was commanded by Lt Col W.L.
Pemberton of the 3rd Battalion, 60th Rifles. Under him
were the 57th Regt, six companies of his own 3rd/6Oth
Rifles (commanded by Lt Col F.V. Northey, about
whom more will be related later in this account) 190
sailors, and a company of the Royal Marine Light
Infantry. In addition, the remnants of the Natal Native
Contingent had been regrouped and posted to what was
now referred to as the 4th and 5th Battalions, N.N.C.
The Artillery for the invasion consisted of two 9-pr
guns, two 24-pound rocket tubes, and two Gatling guns.
Finally, Maj Percy Barrow commanded some 70
Mounted Infantry (which included a newly established
Unit called the Natal Volunteer Guides, commanded by
Capt Friend Addison) 130 Natal Natives, and 150 blacks
supplied by John Dunn.
Chelmsford's new force totalled over 3300 whites and
almost 2300 blacks. In view of the lessons learnt at
Isandlwana, stringent measures were taken to ensure
that such a debacle did not re-occur; ammunition was
more evenly distributed throughout the column and
strict laagering instructions were given for
implementation when the column halted on overnight
stops, with both out- and inlying pickets posted in
strength around the camp.
With Chelmsford was an unbelievably long convoy of
wagons and animals which stretched out his column to
well over five kilometres! However, on the march this
occasionally became more than 16 km, usually as a
result of the column becoming held up at the numerous
drifts which it encountered en route. This situation
alone could have presented serious problems for
Chelmsford had his adversaries been more tactically
minded, for one need only observe the old drifts over
the Inyoni and Amatikulu Rivers to appreciate the
problems that were encountered when, in most cases,
only one wagon at a time could cross the flooded rivers.
The march began at 06h00 on 29th March and the
column made slow and steady progress, encountering
the problems referred to.
The Amatikulu River was crossed by the Advance
Division which then proceeded for approximately 2,5
km past the drift (which can still be seenjust to the left of
the present bridge over the Amatikulu) and established
a camp, to await the arrival of the Rear Division. The
crossing had taken the column almost an entire day to
complete and the distance between bivouacs was only
approximately 3,5 km.
On the 1st April, Capt W.C.F. Molyneaux rode out of
the camp, accompanied by John Dunn, to select a laager
site for that night. They chose one on a slight rise near
the south bank of the Inyezane River and close by the
burnt out Gingindlovu military kraal. A certain amount
of uncertainty about the exact locality of the site of this
kraal has existed for many years but a great deal of
recent research has established almost without doubt
that it is situated on the farm Kia-Ora, belonging to Mr
M. Kramer. The laager site has been almost bisected by
the present road from Gingindhlovu to Eshowe and was
a few metres east of the small military cemetery.
Towards evening, the wagons had completed the laager
and the men settled down to a wet, miserable night.
Maj. Barrow's scouts had reported the presence of
Zulus in the vicinity of the Umisa ridge, a long feature
which stretches in the shape of a half moon from the
Amatikulu River in the West, to Umisa Hill, which is at
beacon 153, above Overdene Estates. In addition, Col
Pearson heliographed Chelmsford from Eshowe
advising him that he could clearly observe a Zulu Impi
approaching the Inyezane Valley. On the night of the
1st, Dunn and Capt Molyneaux rode out in the
direction of the Inyezane River to check the presence of
any Zulus across the stream and they later reported that
a large number of Zulu camp fires were burning,
indicating the presence of a large impi. It was generally
expected that the Zulus would attack the following day.
Even as the camp stood to at first light on the 2nd
April, the outlying pickets galloped in to announce an
imminent attack by the Zulus. A heavy mist shrouded
the surrounding countryside making visibility difficult.
However, it was not even necessary to position the men,
for they had all been primed for the attack and had
taken up their posts as follows:
North (front) face- 60th Rifles
Right flank face - 57th Regiment
Left flank face - 99th Regiment and 'the Buffs'
Rear face - 91st Regiment
Each angle was manned by the Naval Brigade,
Bluejackets from HMS Boadicea and Marines. The
Gatling from Boadicea was mounted in the
North-eastern corner and the two rocket tubes under Lt
Kerr were positioned on the North-west corner,
whereas the two 9-pr guns under Lt Kingscote covered
the South-west. The second Gatling and two more
rocket tubes covered the South-eastern approach and
these were under Commander Brackenbury.
At 05h45, the outlying pickets of the 60th and 99th
Regiment galloped in to herald the arrival of the Zulus.
By 06h00, the attack had commenced on the north
front where the Zulus had first been observed. They
were commanded by Somapo and Dabulamanzi, who
had been given strict instructions by Cetshwayo to
prevent the relief column from linking up with Col
Pearson in Eshowe. They were about to discover to their
cost the effect of their disregard of these orders!
The Impi was first observed as the mist began to lift.
Even before the impi crossed the Inyezane River, it had
begun to split up into the traditional Zulu
horn-formation, with the two horns running ahead of
the chest or loins. As the impi drew opposite the laager,
it entered the water and splashed across, the right wing
and loins split up again and trotted over the Umisa Hill
to the west. Having split up, it became clear that the
column was facing no less than six Zulu Regiments, as
well as a reserve, the former totalling over 10 000 and
the reserve in excess of 2000. Most were warriors who
had fought at Isandlwana, the regiments being the Uve,
in Gobamakhosi, umCijo, umHlanga, uMbonambi, and
the head-ringed uThulwana.
The Gatling from HMS Boadicea rattled off the first
shots at a range of 1000 metres, and the Zulus dropped
into the long grass and reappeared some 300 metres
from the shelter trench, at which range fire was brought
to bear on them in volleys. This checked their advance
to some extent, and prompted Lord Chelmsford to
order Maj Barrow to make a somewhat premature
charge with his mounted infantry, in an attempt to
check the advance of the Zulu left horn. The Zulus were
quick to realize that Barrow was uncomfortably far
from the laager and threatened to cut him off in the
rear. Chelmsford ordered him back to the safety of the
laager but the men had to fight their way in.
Despite fearless determination, the Zulus were
unable to advance to within more than 20 metres of the
laager and this only by launching wave after wave of
attacks. Despite the fact that the British were so well
entrenched, they suffered some serious casualties. Lt
Col Northey being hit in the shoulder, and although the
naval surgeon managed to extract the bullet, at the time
it was not realized that the slug had severed an artery,
putting him out of the fight and resulting in his death
some days later. Capt Barrow and Lt Col Crealock were
also slightly wounded and Lt Courtenay and Capt
Molyneux had their horses shot from under them.
Once the Zulus had realized that the Gatling had
checked any further advance from the North, they
turned their attention to the West (left face) of the
laager and it was during this attack that Lt G.C.J.
Johnson of the 99th Regt was killed. At the same time
another attack developed from the direction of Umisa
Hill, in the rear. Throughout the attack, the Zulus kept
up a withering fire from behind the cover of bushes or
long grass.
At this stage, Chelmsford ordered Maj Barrow to
attack once again with his mounted infantry. They had
been engaged in clearing the front face of the laager
from the outside and accordingly redirected their
attention to the impi's right flank. It was probably this
manoeuvre that finally broke the Zulus' determination,
coupled with the fact that they realized that they were
unable to penetrate the laager from the rear, which they
had thought poorly defended. On the appearance of
Barrow's men, the Zulus broke and started their retreat,
hotly pursued by the Mounted Infantry and the Natal
Native Contingent.
The pursuit was continued for several kilometres,
resulting in the flight becoming a rout. The reserve
impi on Umisa Hill joined the general exodus and by
07h30 the Zulus had all but disappeared. Many of the
fleeing warriors were sabred by the Mounted Infantry
and whilst Chelmsford claims that they were highly
successful, D.R. Morris mentions in 'The Washing of the
Spears' that many of the blows were successfully parried
by the warriors' rawhide shields.
The Zulus lost heavily. Over 470 bodies were buried
initially and more than 200 were subsequently found.
The Gatling gun and artillery in particular took a heavy
toll; in addition, scores were wounded, many to die in
solitude later. Hundreds of Martini Henry rifles were
recovered, most of which bore the stamp of the 24th
Regiment on their butts; grim reminders of the disaster
at Isandlwana some nine weeks earlier. The British lost
two officers and 11 other ranks killed and about 50
wounded, and the dead were buried close to the laager
where they lie to this day.
Those still besieged in Eshowe who had not fallen ill
with fever, including Col Pearson, observed much of
the battle of Gingindlovu from vantage points
overlooking the coastal plain below. Most of the Zulus
who had participated in the siege had joined the impis
engaged in action. Once it had become clear that the
Zulus had been routed, Pearson flashed his
congratulations to Chelmsford by heliograph, the latter
politely acknowledging and informing Pearson that he
anticipated arriving in Eshowe the following day.
Early on the 3rd, a flying column left the camp at
Gingindlovu and proceeded along the track to Eshowe,
leaving the rest of the invasion force to prepare to
advance along a route closer to the coast. Col Pearson
rode out to meet them and the column trickled in to the
fort at Kwa Mondi, the first regiment to enter being the
91st Highlanders and the last man arriving at about
midnight: Eshowe had finally been relieved after a siege
that had lasted some 10 weeks. The Eshowe garrison
left the fort and proceeded to Fort Pearson, by which
time an additional two officers and two other ranks had
died of fever.
Lord Chelmsford followed Pearson out of Eshowe
some 24 hours later and reached Gingindlovu on the
7th April. Here, the command of the column was
handed to Col Pemberton who established a new
advance base approximately 8 km from Gingindlovu,
overlooking the Inyezane River, which was named Fort
Chelmsford.
Of the battlefield today, little remains. Mr Kramer
has excavated numerous relics, and apart from the
small military cemetery, there is very little evidence of
the trenches or their whereabouts apart from the
occasional cartridge case which is exposed by the
elements. A small granite cross alongside the road at the
turnoff to Kia Ora is the sole reminder of this short,
sharp, but important battle.
Bibliography
Return to Journal Index OR Society's Home page
South African Military History Society / scribe@samilitaryhistory.org