The South African
Military History Society

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Krygshistoriese Vereniging

Military History Journal
Vol 2 No 6 - December 1973


by H.W. Kinsey

Editor's note: This article is a transcription of a talk by Mr H.W. Kinsey to the S.A. Military History Society in December, 1972. Part l was published in Vol. 2 No. 5 June 1973

Apart from the general political situation in the Transvaal, there was a State of restlessness, particularly in Sekukuniland and its surrounding areas from the time of the conclusion of the peace treaty after the First Sekukuni War and the outbreak of the Second Sekukuni War.

Sekukuni did not appear to regard himself as a subject of the South African Republic. He sent a message to Theophilus Shepstone through Dr Alexander Merensky asking for protection from the Boers and, at Shepstone's request, President Burgers agreed to appoint a commission of inquiry, and Capt. M. Clarke, R.A., and Mr. M. Osborn, with Rider Haggard as secretary, went as witnesses to the investigation. The report of the commission indicated a certain amount of confusion and Shepstone reported to Carnarvon that there was little foundation for the declaration by the Republic that peace had been concluded with Sekukuni who did not appear to regard himself as a subject of the Republic, although it seemed that he would readily agree to being a subject of the British.

After the annexation of the Transvaal on 12th April, 1877, Shepstone placed some pressure on Sekukuni who finally agreed to accept Shepstone's conditions for remaining in the Transvaal and to pay the fine of the 2,000 head of cattle. However, with the withdrawal of the volunteers from the forts in the light of the peaceable attitude of Sekukuni, which seems to have been largely dictated by the shortage of food in Sekukuniland, there was no longer any pressing need for Sekukuni to pay the cattle. In fact, only about 245 head were paid in July and August, 1877, and at a personal interview with Sekukuni on 29th July, 1877, Clark was informed that, as so many of his cattle were dead, he could not pay at once and that it might take him years to do so.

Although Shepstone had disbanded the volunteers, he appreciated the need for force in the area and he proposed to replace the volunteers with a Zulu police force.

Apart from sporadic thefts of cattle and some trouble with Legolwana, a sister of Sekukuni, and Pokwane, a minor chief near Fort Weeber, there was no serious trouble in the area and Clarke encouraged the farmers who had deserted their farms at the time of the First Sekukuni War to return to them. However, early in January, 1878, there were unmistakable signs that Sekukuni was preparing for hostilities with a view to driving the Europeans out of the area on the eastern side of the Lulu Mountains and, in February, 1878, about 100 of Sekukuni's men joined with Legolwana in an attack on Pokwane in which many were killed on both sides. Clark attempted to keep the peace here and at Maserumule, and at this stage Sekukuni advised that he intended to make himself paramount chief of all the tribes, but disclaimed any aggressive intentions towards the Europeans.

It should be mentioned at this stage, that Capt. Clarke had been appointed by Shepstone as Special Commissioner for the Lydenburg district and the gold fields.

Clarke warned Sekukuni that if he attacked the friendly Natives he would be breaking the treaty he had made, but Sekukuni replied that the English were afraid to fight (as they had not assisted Pokwane), that the Europeans at Fort Burgers and in the Waterval area must leave his land, and that he was ready for war as the British would see.

It was not possible to spare any troops from Pretoria and, until they could be supplied, the situation depended on the 107 Zulu police and the volunteers under Native Commissioner C. Schultz at Fort Weeber, which became known as the Provisional Armed and Mounted Police (P.A.M.P.). Captain Gerrit van Deventer was instructed by Shepstone to raise a body of volunteers. In the meantime, however, the situation worsened steadily and, on the 8th March, 1878, Fort Burgers was pillaged by the Bapedi shortly after its evacuation by G. Eckersley who had been one of the lieutenants in the Lydenburg Volunteers, and his party to the Waterval valley, where Fort Jellalabad was built subsequently.

Bands of Bapedi now proceeded to roam the countryside and harass the farmers east of the Lulu Mountains by stealing cattle and burning homesteads. Two farmers, Jan Venter and J. Minnaar, were attacked and Venter was fatally wounded, whilst H. T. Glynn's house at Krugerspost became a refuge, and the defences of Krugerspost were strengthened. Two other laagers were also established, one of which was at the farm of the Veld Cornet for Origstad, Abel Erasmus.

Lydenburg looked to its defences, whilst anxiety was felt by the population of Middelburg, relatively far to the west, as Middelburg had no laager or place of refuge, and this gives some idea of the awe in which Sekukuni and the Bapedi were held by people in the Transvaal.

Aylward was authorized to recruit a troop of mounted men, which became known as "B" Troop of the P.A.M.P. to distinguish it from the "A" Troop under Schultz, which was now sent to Lydenburg to strengthen the defences there. A body of 50 Special Constabulary, under Stafford Parker as Chief Constable, was also organized from men from the gold fields at Pilgrims Rest.

Sekukuni had by now brought most of the small tribes in the neighbourhood under his control, and there is no doubt that he was in contact with Cetewayo who did send runners to Sekukuniland. British officers were of the view that the Zulu trouble was the cause of most of South Africa's problems at that time. It also appears from some accounts that Cetewayo sent gold to Sekukuni to persuade him to commence hostilities, but Sekukuni declined on the grounds that Cetewayo had not aided him in his war with the Boers. All the same it seems clear that Sekukuni's hostile intentions were not really influenced either way by encouragement or otherwise from Zululand.

Sekukuni's attitude now appears to have undergone a change which is apparent by the lack of hostility on the part of the Bapedi towards the Boers in the vicinity, despite the previous land encroachment on the part of the Boers. It is known of course that Sekukuni was getting guns and ammunition from some Boer 'gun runners', but the real reason for this change of attitude appears to have been that official action against the Bapedi since the annexation of the Transvaal had become the responsibility of the British. Another factor was undoubtedly the treasonable activities of certain Boers against the English. In fact Abel Erasmus, had sent a message to Sekukuni telling him to stand firm against the English and not to pay the cattle fine. The Boers were going to fight the British and take back the Transvaal. It is also alleged that the Bapedi were kept informed by the Boers of the movements of the policing forces at this time. Incidentally, the same Abel Erasmus is alleged to have been implicated in the murder of one of his servants for reporting to the British his messages to Sekukuni. A warrant was issued for the arrest of Erasmus on a charge of rebellion, sedition and murder, but he disappeared for about six months after which he finally gave himself up. He was, however, acquitted of the charge of murder owing to insufficient evidence and was bound over on the other charges which were never pressed.


The unsettled situation in the Transvaal set the stage for the Second Sekukuni War but, before full-scale operations were launched later in the year, a mounted force of about 50 volunteers from Pretoria under Captain Gerrit van Deventer was sent to subdue the Chieftainess Legolwana, Sekukuni's sister, at her stronghold at Maserumule near Fort Weeber. Captain van Deventer left Pretoria on 17th March, 1878, with Captain Otto Riedel in charge of the artillery with two small Krupp guns -- they collected another cannon at Middelburg, where they arrived on 23rd March.

In the meantime, Captain Clarke and Lieutenant L. H. Lloyd arrived at Fort Weeber with a force of Zulu Police on 24th March, 1878, to find that the fort had been burned down by Legolwana whilst it had been unoccupied. Captain van Deventer and his force also arrived at Fort Weeber on 30th March, seven of his horses having died of horse sickness since leaving Pretoria.

Chieftainess Legolwana was called on to surrender and was offered a safe conduct to Sekukuni but, as she refused, plans were made to attack her stronghold which was within three miles of Fort Weeber. The forces engaged were the volunteers under Captain van Deventer and the Zulu Police. Smith tells us, 'The plan of attack was that the volunteers under van Deventer, the Zulu Police and 162 of Zebediela's men under Captain W. King, Native Commissioner for Waterberg, should attack the stronghold, a well-fortified conical mountain, from the north. A Native contingent of 400 sent by minor loyal chiefs under the leadership of selected volunteers, was to attack from the south, whilst a contingent of 200 Natives from Pokwane was to attack from the East.' The attack took place at daybreak on 5th April, 1878, with Riedel firing shells into the hill with a four-pounder Krupp, which was the signal for the advance and, after a hard fight lasting about two hours, the volunteers and the Zulu Police carried the north of the hill, and succeeded in capturing many cattle, sheep and goats. Four Zulus were killed and five wounded, two of them severely, whilst the leaders of the Zulus, Lieutenant L. Lloyd and Drill Instructor Sergeant Mulligan were wounded. Six of the Native contingent were also killed, but as the attacks by the Native contingents had been ineffective, owing to reluctance on their part, they had accomplished nothing. They were allowed to attack the following day with the same result, except that, unfortunately, Captain van Deventer received a slight wound in the leg. Although the wound in his leg healed, he made very poor progress and died on 30th April, 1878. His grave is the only one amongst the graves at Fort Weeber which is marked.

Although the attack on Maserumule had failed in its objective, Clarke's forces continued to harass Legolwana's area as a result of which she made peace overtures and subsequently attempted to flee. She made her way to Sekukuni, whilst large numbers of her followers fled westwards. These fugitives were harassed by Clarke's forces but were not harmed. Quantities of arms and cattle were taken and the followers were distributed amongst the loyal chiefs. Thus the branch of the Bapedi tribe of Maserumule under Legolwana was broken up and the western area of Sekukuniland cleared of opposition.

In the meantime, the forces in the field were growing and by the middle of the year there was quite a force of Transvaal volunteers under Captain I. P. Ferreira, Lieutenant P. Raaff, and Lieutenant Henry Nourse. A detachment of two officers and 101 other ranks from the Diamond Fields Horse under Captain James Stewart volunteered for service in Sekukuniland and left Kimberley on 4th May, 1878. However soon after their arrival in the Transvaal the men 'were nearly driven to mutiny by neglect and the noticeable want of provision for their equipment'.

At this stage Clarke, acting on the orders of Sir Theophilus Shepstone and with the forces at his disposal, concerned himself with keeping the peace and preventing Sekukuni from raiding too far from his stronghold in the east, until such time as a sufficiently strong force could be mustered to launch an attack on his stronghold. There were insufficient troops available in the Transvaal and Shepstone's position was not made any easier by the attitude of the Boers under the annexation.

A number of forts were planned to assist in strengthening the plain between Fort Weeber and the Lulu Mountains.

The building of Fort Mamalube was commenced on the 27th April, 1878, about 12 miles from Fort Weeber and about two miles from the stronghold of Chief Mamalube, an ally of Sekukuni. This fort, of which the author has an original plan in his possession, but whose exact whereabouts he has not been able to establish definitely although he is sure he has stood on the site, was built with brick and sod walls and surrounded by a ditch. The fort was about 58 yards long by about 40 yards wide with two bastions at opposite corners.

Another fort, Fort Faugh-a-ballagh, Gaelic for 'Clear the way', was built near the Magnet Heights, to command the pass to the Steelpoort Valley. Mr. K. W. Smith, to whom I am indebted for so much information in his thesis which I have quoted freely here, records that Fort Faugh-a-ballagh was built of stone about July, 1878, about 800 yards from Magnet Heights. The walls were five feet high and the fort was about 60 feet square.

By the middle of the year there was a large number of volunteers in the field under Captain Ferreira, known as Ferreira's Horse, under Captain W. van Deventer, under Captain Otto Riedel, and under Lieutenant P. Raaff. There was also a Zulu Police force of 96 men under Captain C. Stewart (presumablv 'Zulu' Stewart), and a Native contingent under Captain A. Ritter (believed to be the grandfather of E. A. Ritter, author of 'Shaka Zulu') .

Smith states that Captain Fred Carrington (later General Sir Frederick Carrington) was appointed Commandant of the Volunteers of whom there were about 500 in the field, including the Diamond Fields Horse.

Throughout this time there were minor skirmishes in the vicinity of the forts. An attack on Fort Mamalube was repulsed, and, subsequently, about the middle of July, 1878, the Natives in the mountain stronghold above Fort Mamalube abandoned their strongholds and surrendered. There was an offensive action late in June at the Magnet Heights with the loss of five Volunteers and one Zulu killed, and seven Volunteers and two Zulus wounded. On 15th July, Captain Ferreira and a number of his men destroyed a large number of huts on the east side of the Lulu Mountains and the only casualty appears to have been Lieutenant Henry Nourse who received a buckshot wound in the right thigh. On 26th July, 1878, some horses and cattle were carried off from Fort Faugh-a-ballagh when one volunteer was killed, and on 7th August a party belonging to the Diamond Fields Horse was surprised on the Dwars River, where they were camped and whence they patrolled the Steelpoort River, and lost 52 horses and 48 oxen. This force which had been raised in Griqualand West, was now rendered almost useless by the loss of its horses, and many of the Volunteers, finding the discipline irksome, began to withdraw about the same time.

Also at this time insubordination in the Zulu Police became a problem and this force was disbanded after a minor mutiny.

It is important to mention here that regular troops entered the scene before the middle of the year, for on the 17th April, 1878, 300 men of the 13th Light Infantry (1st Battalion) -- Prince Albert's Light Infantry (later known as the Somerset Light Infantry) -- under the command of Major E. L. England, marched on Middelburg and Lydenburg.

This then was the situation in Sekukuniland when Colonel Hugh Rowlands, VC, CB was appointed commandant of the troops in the Transvaal in August, 1878, by Lord Chelmsford, the General Commanding Officer in South Africa, and regular troops, additional to the 13th Regiment, were to become available for use in the Operations against Sekukuni.

Detachments of the 80th Regiment -- 2nd Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment -- arrived on the scene from Natal and this force was supplemented by about 200 men of the Frontier Light Horse under Major Redvers BulIer, who distinguished himself in the Zulu War, where he gained the VC at Hlobane, but who failed his troops in the South African War. It is recorded that the Frontier Light Horse was the only cavalry regiment raised bv the Imperial Government during the Kaffir Wars. It was raised at Kingwilliamstown by Lieutenant Fred Carrington of the 2/24 Regiment in 1877. Colonel Rowlands also managed to secure the services of about 500 Swazis, despite the reluctance of the Swazi king, and these men were divided amongst the various fortified posts for general duties.

Colonel Rowlands decided to build a fort on the Olifants River near Mphahlele and the building of this fort, which was known as Fort Olifants, was carried out by a company of the 1/13 Regiment under Captain Waddy. It appears to have been Colonel Rowland's intention to use this fort as a base for an attack on Sekukuni's stronghold, but he changed his plan in view of the difficulties, mainly of distance and extended lines of communication, of attacking the stronghold from the north. Accordingly, he changed his operational base to Fort Burgers which was only about 25 miles from Sekukuni's stronghold. He also believed that the approach was better through more open country with adequate water and grass available. He also believed that this would be the line of flight followed by Sekukuni if defeated.

Incidentally, another fort, which had previously been earmarked for construction near the confluence of the Waterval and Spekboom Rivers about 16 miles from Fort Burgers, was later constructed by the 1/13 Regiment in October, 1878, and named by that Regiment as 'Fort Jellalabad'. It was also known as 'Fort Rowlands'.

At the end of September, 1878, Colonel Rowland's forces were deployed as follows:

Fort Weeber Detachments of 1/13 Regiment and 80th Regiment, sixty mounted volunteers.
Forts Mamalube and Faugh-a-ballagh Fifty men of 1/13 Regiment and fifty volunteers at each fort.
Along the Olifant's Detachments of l/l3 and 80th River Regiments and Volunteers to prevent Sekukuni from escaping northwards or getting help from Mphahlele.
Krugers Post Fifty men of 80th Regiment to prevent Sekukuni from escaping eastwards.
Fort Burgers Operational base.

His total force was 1,216 infantry and 611 mounted men but, as the attacking force was composed of 130 infantry and 338 mounted men, it will be seen that the bulk of his force was used in garrisoning the various posts around Sekukuni's country.

The attacking force left Fort Burgers on Thursday, 3rd October, 1878, but the delay caused by the change of plan was, as Smith tells us, unfortunate, as this change involved the re-disposition of his forces down to Fort Burgers, and the season for horse sickness was at hand. The force, which also had two 7-pounder Krupp mountain guns, was composed of the Frontier Light Horse, some mounted infantry and two companies (130 strong) of the 1/13 Regiment. It is difficult to find exact details regarding the guns other than as mentioned above, but McToy tells us that there were two Royal Artillery' detachments at Fort Burgers and that the mule battery with its two 7-pounder guns, accompanied the attacking force.

The force covered about eight miles the first day, but by the end of the second day they had covered little more than half the distance to the Stad. The force had moved through broken ground and thick bush and had been fired upon by hostile Natives from numerous kopjes. Although the Frontier Light Horse had been sent on ahead to select a suitable camp site they were unable to find anything other than a dry stream in which holes were dug for water. Sufficient water was obtained for the men, but insufficient for the horses and the transport and slaughter oxen. That night the camp was attacked from three sides and the slaughter oxen stampeded. The attack was driven off after about half-an-hour. The next day a further four miles was covered to a spot where there were pools of water which enabled the animals to be watered. A further three miles was then covered but water was still not available, except by digging and then only enough for the men and half the horses.

Rowlands decided that, in view of the lack of water and grass, there was no alternative but to return to Fort Burgers which he reached on the 7th October, 1878, after an exhausting and thirsty trek back. The force was fortunate in that only one man had been wounded, but a large number of horses was lost through horse sickness and lack of water.

H. W. Struben had warned that this route should not be taken as insufficient water would be found, and so the first major military expedition against Sekukuni, at a cost of 54 592 Pounds (UK) had failed.

However, after the return to Fort Burgers, Colonel Rowlands attacked Sonbyan, one of Umsutu's headmen, at a place called Tolyana Stad near Umsutu's Place on 27th October, 1878, with a large force of 730 men and three guns. Kraals were burned down, grain destroyed and a number of cattle taken. Private McToy, in his delightful book already quoted, gives a very graphic and exciting account of this action in which Colour Sergeant John Pegg was killed and seven men were wounded. The grave of Colour-Sergeant Pegg may be seen not far from the present Steelpoort Station.

At this stage the campaign was interrupted by the withdrawal of troops to Natal in preparation for the Zulu War.


The Zulu War had ended with the battle of Ulundi on 4th July, 1879, and the capture of Cetewayo on 28th August, and so the stage was set for the final phase of the Second Sekukuni War which had been interrupted by the Zulu War. Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had been cheated of the honours of the Zulu War by the decisive action of Lord Chelmsford who had been determined to vindicate his losses at Isandhlwana, was determined that nothing should go wrong with his Sekukuni campaign. Sir Owen Lanyon had been ready to take the field in July, 1879, but his actions were halted by Wolseley who also wished to ensure that Sekukuni would not be persuaded of his invincibility if further action against him was unsuccessful. Wolseley did, however, attempt to avert a further war by offering Sekukuni the chance to live in peace if he paid a fine of 2 500 cattle by the end of September and agreed to the establishment of a military post on his mountain as an outward sign of British supremacy. This offer was scorned by Sekukuni and Wolseley regretted having wasted valuable time by seeking a peaceable solution. In the meantime, however, all available troops had been concentrated in the Transvaal. Wolseley was determined that his expedition against Sekukuni would not fail.

The Transvaal Field Force was to consist of 1 400 British infantry, 400 mounted colonials, and about 10 000 Natives. Wolseley, with brilliant staff work by his Chief of Staff Captain (later Sir) Henry Brackenbury, who 'lavished meticulous care on the preparations', boasted that he would sip his afternoon tea in Sekukuni's hut on the afternoon of 28th November, 1879.

Wolseley moved his headquarters to Middelburg in the middle of October, 1879, and on the 23rd of that month he reviewed the main column under Lieutenant-Colonel Baker Russell, whose staff officer was Captain Herbert Stewart, before they marched on to the advanced post at Fort Weeber the next day. Joseph Lehmann in his book All Sir Garnet tells us that:

'The men looked smart and ready for active service. The British troops were in their normal red serge with white helmets; the Colonials wore brown cord and the staff were in blue. Nearly all the officers wore on their head-dress what was called the Sekukuni button, a meercat's tail carefully fashioned into a button'.

A large Native force was collected from various Transvaal tribes, but the most important of the Natives were to be the Swazis, natural enemies of the Bapedi and very good in-fighters. Captain Norman MacLeod, formerly of the 74th Highlanders and Special Commissioner and British Agent for Swaziland, managed to raise about 8,000 Swazis who were to be permitted to keep the cattle they might take from the Bapedi and to have a share in whatever fine was levied against the Bapedi. A few had rifles but the majority were armed with assegais.

It is interesting to note that Captain MacLeod collected this magnificent contingent of Native volunteers and marched them over 150 miles from the Swazi King's kraal and drilled them on the way so that, as William Macdonald records, they marched 'with the swing of centuries of conquest'. It appears that, when General Ulysses Grant of the United States Army saw the Black Watch marching out of Edinburgh Castle, he said to the Scottish General who was with him, 'These men march with the swing of centuries of conquest'.

General Wolseley and his staff arrived at Fort Weeber on the 28th October, 1879, to find that, owing to transport difficulties, supplies were behind schedule and inadequate. He set about rectifying this state of affairs with great energy and then reconnoitred the area ahead to get some idea of the nature of the mountains and the problems of the advance. He even rushed back to Lydenburg with his aide-de-camp, Major Hugh McCalmont (later Major-General Sir Hugh McCalmont) on horseback, some 86 miles in 26 hours through violent thunderstorms for a general discussion with Major Henry Bushman, who was to command the second column assembled there and which was to consist of the Swazis, two companies of the 80th Regiment, two companies of the 94th Regiment, some local mounted rifles, including the Lydenburg Rifles, and assorted Natives.

Sir Garnet gathered every scrap of information he could about the Bapedi from sources such as the Rev. Alexander Merensky who probably knew more about the Bapedi than any other European, and Colonel Ignatius Ferreira, the noted leader and expert on Native warfare, and decided that rather than cross the mountains from the west, as these were too rugged for horses and there was a lack of water, the main column would march up the valley of the Olifants River, swing round the tip of the Lulu Mountains, and descend southwards down a valley some 20 miles long, running north and south between two great ridges, and attack Sekukuni's town at the southern end. At the same time the stad would be attacked from the east by Major Bushman's column, based at Fort Burgers, after marching along the eastern slopes of the Lulu Mountains.

It is necessary to bear in mind at this point the great distances involved in conducting the campaign so far from established towns with nothing available in the way of local resources except grazing and water as all the grain fields had been abandoned. The supply lines from Lydenburg and Middelburg were lengthy, whilst a supply line along the bushveld road from Pretoria to Fort Olifants, which was close to the advanced post at Mapashlela's Drift, near where Fort Albert Edward was built, had also to be protected in view of the menacing behaviour of the Transvaal Boers. It appears, however, that at no time did the columns suffer from a lack of supplies once the advance got under way.

I have already given you the composition of the second or eastern column, and it might be appropriate here to give you the details of the main column which seems from various accounts to have been made up as follows:

Six companies of 2/21st Regiment (Royal Scots Fusiliers)
Six companies of 94th Regiment (2nd Bn Connaught Rangers)
Detachments of 80th Regiment (2nd Bn South Staffordshires)
Ferreira's Horse
Border Horse
Transvaal Mounted Rifles
Two Squadrons Coloured mounted men
Four mountain guns under R.A. Officers
Royal Engineers
Rustenburg Contingent (Bantu levies)
Zoutpansberg Contingent (Bantu levies)
Mapoch's Contingent (Bantu levies)

It is not possible to give clear details of the artillery as Tylden talks of four mountain guns under Royal Artillery officers, partly manned by infantrymen and partly by Pretoria volunteers, whilst Smith refers to four guns of the Transvaal Artillery.

Readers who know the bushveld, and particularly those who have stood high up on the Lulu Mountains above Dsjate overlooking the plain which is the most easterly portion of the Bushveld Igneous Complex and which leads from the north into the mountain region sheltering Sekukuni's Stad, will appreciate the situation and realise the heat encountered by the marching troops during the day and the cold nights as they crossed the open veld on their march up the western edge of the Lulu Mountains in order to round the northern tip before marching once more in a southerly direction to attack the Stad.

Sir Garnet arrived at Fort Albert Edward on 23rd November, 1879, and decided that sufficient supplies had been concentrated there to enable the main force to advance with the Colonial Volunteers in the lead. Baker Russell had already formed an advanced post about seven miles beyond, named 'Seven-mile-post', and fighting commenced that day with a successful assault by men of Ferreira's Horse on the kraal of Umkwane, one of Sekukuni's followers on a mountain opposite the post.

Early on the morning of the 24th November, 1879, the main column left a small garrison at Fort Albert Edward and entered the main valley, and the following day, 25th November, the Volunteers, supported by a few regulars, took Water Kop without opposition about three miles from the Stad. It appears that by now Sekukuni had called in all outlying detachments for the final stand.

The Water Kop was fortified and called Fort Alexandra.

In the meantime, Captain Herbert Stewart had ridden to the east, across the mountains, and had found Bushman's auxiliary column at an entrenched post, now called Fort George, with adequate supplies and ready to advance. This Fort George was on a hill named Morakaneng about five miles from the base of the mountain behind the Stad and about three miles from Fort Alexandra on Water Kop.

With an escort of men from Ferreira's Horse, Sir Garnet rode forward to reconnoitre the battle area. He examined the approaches to the mountain and managed to get within 250 yards of the Fighting Koppie which he found, by looking through his telescope, to be swarming with Bapedi.

However, no shots were fired at him.

This koppie which became known as 'The Fighting Koppie' or 'Wolseley's Fighting Kop', but which should really be regarded as 'Sekukuni's Fighting Koppie', was the centre of Sekukuni's stronghold and guarded the entrance to his Stad. It is geologically a norite extrusion from the level plain of the Bushveld Igneous Complex and being honeycombed with caves and massive caverns created by the great splits in the huge granite boulders formed an ideal fortification for the Bapedi who had built stone walls and defences, had laid in supplies of grain (grinding places may still be seen) and also limited supplies of water. President Burgers referred to it as the 'Gibraltar of the Transvaal', and the place is well described by D. A. L. Hall in The Bushveld Igneous Complex. It is about 300 feet in length, 200 feet in breadth and 150 feet in height.

After examining the 'Fighting Koppie', Sir Garnet selected a good camp-site and a position for the guns, and then rode over to Fort George to inform Major Bushman of the plan of attack. The mountain would be hit first, whilst the 'Fighting Koppie' would be shelled and contained by the regulars. Once the defenders of Sekukuni's mountain had been destroyed or driven off, the isolated rock fortress would be assaulted from all sides. Major Bushman was given orders to have his men in position at 4.15 a.m. on 28th November, 1879.

Joseph Lehmann in an objective and detailed account of the advance on Sekukuni's Stad, in his book to which I have already referred, tells us that Nature takes sides in these things for violent storms of rain and hail harassed the advancing column until the narrow old Boer road, already partly overgrown with dense bush, became almost impassable. The wagons stuck and the cracking of the whips and the thunder and lightning must have resounded throughout the valley as the wagon column struggled forward. Men of the 21st and the 94th Regiments who had been under arms for 24 hours marched in rags that had been turned many colours by the mud and rain, and stumbled into the new camp site in the early hours of 27th November, 1879. And so the stage was set for the final assault on Sekukuni.

It will be seen that the force was poised in a flat valley about a mile wide, intersected by a small stream, looking southwards into the end of the valley formed by the western and eastern ranges of the Lulu Mountains. Sekukuni's Stad was built partly in the valley and partly up the slopes of the mountain in the western range, with the slopes fortified with stone walls and schanzes. Lieutenant-Colonel Baker Russell divided his main column into three parts:

The right attack, which would begin the assault was assigned to Colonel Ferreira and his dismounted commando, backed by Native contingents, with the object of taking the kraal.

The left attack was entrusted to Major Frederick Carrington and the rest of the Colonials, also supported by other Native contingents, with the object of clearing the Stad and to watch that no reinforcements reached Sekukuni.

The central position was given to Lieutenant-Colonel John Murray and six companies of the 2/21st Regiment (Royal Scots Fusiliers) and the six companies of the 94th Regiment (later designated as the 2nd Battalion, Connaught Rangers), detachments of the 80th Regiment (2nd Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment), the Royal Engineers, four guns of the Transvaal Artillery and the Rustenburg Contingent. Their mission was to act as a reserve and keep down the fire on the 'Fighting Koppie', which they would eventually storm.

Then finally, Lieutenant-Colonel Baker Russell relied on Major Bushman and the Swazis to ascend the mountain from the eastern or rear side during the night, so as to reach the summit and begin the assaulting descent upon the Stad in the morning, thereby co-operating with Ferreira and Carrington from above.

E. V. Corrie, who was a member of the Lydenburg Rifles, gives a graphic account in The Promised Land, of the early morning start of the column under Major Bushman on the morning of the 28th November, 1879.

He first of all describes the Swazi host when leaving Fort Burgers as follows: 'Before we left Fort Burgers, we were joined by a force of nearly 8,000 Swazies, and never can anyone who beheld these natives forget their magnificent appearance. The Swazie is the perfection of a black warrior, and his war-dress even finer than that of the Zulu Kafir, our crowd of 8,000 were magnificently attired in beautifully-dressed leopard skins, and thick head-dresses of black ostrich feathers. When on the march the dusky companies sweep along at a great rate, each warrior on his left arm carries a shield, black, white, or striped, according to his regiment; from his waist hangs a kilt of leopard tails, or twisted strips of fur, and in the right hand is held the short stabbing assegai - a few of the 8,000 had rifles slung across their backs, but in the fighting that ensued most of the Swazies depended on the assegai. The Lydenburg Rifles was the only mounted force with the column, and to us fell the advanced post.

'Once, when on the march, I was despatched nearly to the rear with orders, and the line of Swazies I passed seemed interminable.'

Corrie then mentions other incidents on the march, but his descrintion of the moving off of the column in the early morning is well worth recording here as the scene mentioned above and the one that follows must have been witnessed by few white men since the time of Tshaka and the Zulu power, and subsequently, of course, in the Zulu War by many who never lived to describe what they had witnessed:

'At punctually four hours before dawn the whispered order was passed to fall in. The moon was then at the full, and poured a flood of light on the most imposing scene we had ever witnessed. From the host of the Swazies there was hardly a sound as they silently gathered in one dense cloud, from the centre of which started their black column, the Kafirs forming in companies as they marched off over the plain, their bare feet giving back little sound as they trod the ground.

'I cannot describe the wild effect produced by the great host of sable warriors. Their towering head-dresses of black ostrich plumes gave them individually an imposing appearance and fictitious stature, while viewed as a mass, the waving plumes and swinging kilts produced a weird effect of ever-changing and cloud-like mass of shadow.

'Meanwhile the Lydenburg Rifles were falling in, and the shrill neigh of a horse or ringing of a loose stirrup iron as we sprang into our saddles sounded rowdy enough, compared with the silent and ghost-like movements of the natives. As we marched off our horses' feet among the stones made more noise than the thousands of Swazies. The 94th and 80th were about falling-in when we started, and soon we could hear the steady tramp of their advance from the rear...'


At about 2 a.m. on the morning of 28th November, 1879, the men were roused, with no bugle calls being sounded, the tents were struck and the men formed up in front of the camp. The column then moved forward swiftly across the valley with sufficient moonlight shining through a cloudy sky to enable them to see the mountain. The various positions were taken up before daylight, with Sir Garnet and his staff seated under a tree to watch the attack, and at the first glimmer of dawn a shell was fired into the 'Fighting Koppie' which became instantly alive with the defenders firing and yelling 'to summon Bapedi courage and to terrorize the foe'.

Smith tells us that Sekukuni's Stad consisted of about 3,000 huts and stretched for about two miles along the foot of the mountain and its lower slopes, that there were many caves above the Stad to which the Bapedi could flee if driven from the Stad and that, unbeknown to the attackers, Sekukuni and his retinue had already retreated to one of these caves above the Stad whence he could watch the battle.

Colonel Ferreira and his corps, with Mapoch's contingent, and some Rustenburgers attacked the western side to try and take the Stad from the heights to the south and, as they advanced from boulder to boulder, taking one krantz after the other under heavy fire, the Bapedi recognized their old enemy Ferreira whom they had christened 'Umtakati' (one who leads a charmed life) and shouted for him to be killed. Although soon deserted by the Mapoch contingent which went off cattle-raiding, Ferreira managed to gain a krantz overlooking the Chief's kraal.

At the same time Major Carrington, with the rest of the Colonials and some other Native contingents, attacked the Stad from the eastern side, but were met with very stern resistance from the Bapedi who had dug a long line of rifle pits along the front of the Stad. However, with the rapid advance of the attackers they were forced to retreat to a donga at the foot of the mountain, and thence to some rocky outcrops on the mountain. It will be remembered that Major Carrington's force was made up of the Transvaal Mounted Rifles and mounted infantry, with the Border Horse bringing up the rear but, as the Native levies refused to advance further than a quarter of a mile from the foot of the mountain, Carrington ordered the Border Horse and the Transvaal Mounted Rifles to dismount and charge while he waited with the mounted infantry to cover the advance, which was over broken ground with boulders and bushes concealing large numbers of Bapedi. Accordingly, they were forced to take cover as heavy and sustained fire kept them pinned down. However, the Native levies, who had recovered their courage, and Major Carrington with the mounted infantry caught up with them, but the advance was prevented by the Bapedi in the caves above.

In the meantime no action was taken by the central column under Lieutenant-Colonel Murray other than to send a company of the 94th Regiment to support Ferreira on the right. It must have been from this position that Captain J. H. Poe of the 94th later drew his famous sketch which has given us so much information about Sekukuni's Stad and the disposition of the forces surrounding the 'Fighting Koppie' and the Stad.

By now it was past 6 a.m. and there was still no sign of the Swazis and all eyes were pinned on the top of the mountain waiting for the support to come from that quarter. It seems, however, that operations being conducted by Major Bushman from the advanced post of Fort George did not go with the same precision as those below the mountain and, in addition, the Swazis were very reluctant to ascend the mountain from the rear as they had not forgotten how they had been deserted by the Boers in 1876, and their witchdoctors had warned them that they would be left in the lurch again. However, once they realized that the Europeans were in earnest, they lost no time in sweeping up the eastern slopes and appearing on the skyline which had been so eagerly scanned. Now there was no hesitation as they poured down the mountainside with a fierce roar, slashing and stabbing at the startled Bapedi and fighting hand to hand from one ledge to another.

As the Swazis swooped down the mountain the Volunteers were able to advance up the mountain towards the Swazis who were inflicting a great massacre on the fleeing Bapedi, and one half of Ferreira's force then descended from the krantz and set fire to the Stad. The Volunteers and the Swazis met half way up the mountain where both Bapedi and Swazi dead lay everywhere, although the Swazi casualties were nowhere like those of the Bapedi. Mr. A. H. Campbell of the Swazi Native Contingent had been shot dead near the top of the mountain, and Smith tells us that his body was never found. Corrie makes the same observation, but I fancy his body was found later and buried at Fort Victoria. Commandant J. E. Macaulay, who commanded the Transvaal Mounted Rifles was shot dead from a cave in the advance up the mountain, and Captain Henry Nourse, of Ferreira's Horse, then took command of the Transvaal Mounted Rifles. Captain F. Maurice, a later biographer of Wolseley, was wounded and received the rank of Brevet Major for his part in the action.

Private Francis Fitzpatrick and Private Thomas Flawn, both of the 94th were awarded Victoria Crosses for their gallant action in rescuing Lieutenant C. J. Dewar of the King's Dragoon Guards, who was attached to the 94th at the time. Dewar, who was severely wounded, was being carried to safety by six Native allies when they were attacked by about 40 Bapedi. The Native allies fled and the two privates who were left in the vicinity rushed to aid Dewar. One man carried Dewar on his back whilst the other covered the retreat and kept off the oncoming enemy.

Thus it was that after about three hours' fighting, i.e. at about 9.30 a.m., Sekukuni's Stad was a thing of the past.

Lieutenant-Colonel Baker Russell now assembled his forces for the attack on the 'Fighting Koppie' on the plain in front of the flaming Stad, and the only sections of the attacking force, which did not join in the assault on the koppie, were the companies of the 80th Regiment and 94th Regiment which had ascended the mountain during the early morning attack. They came down later in the afternoon.

The artillery had been shelling the Koppie since the early morning, but with little effect on the defenders, and those readers who have climbed over the 'Fighting Koppie' and seen the deep crevices and sheltered caves, together with the stone breastworks which had been built by the Bapedi, will understand why. Accordingly, it was decided to attack the Koppie from all sides: the northern face by three companies of the 2/21st Regiment, the headquarters escort of the 80th Regiment and a portion of the Swazi contingent; the Border Horse and more Swazis from the east; the mounted infantry and two companies of the 94th Regiment from the south; and Ferreira's Horse and the remainder of the Swazis from the west. Baker Russell, sword in hand, was to lead the attack up the northern face, whilst Wolseley also granted permission for his staff to join in the attack.

When all the attacking forces were in position, two rockets were sent up as a signal to charge and, with a deafening cheer, the infantrymen with fixed bayonets charged the Koppie. The Swazis, however, once more stood back until they were satisfied that they would not be left to bear the brunt of the attack, but once they saw the infantrymen on the Koppie and accepted that the Europeans were in earnest they charged forward with a roaring battle cry and a swishing sound made by striking their shields against their knees.

Joseph Lehman describes the scene as follows: 'Thousands of knees pounding in unison had the sound of roaring surf. It seemed in harmony with the fusillades, the screams and yells, and the skirls of pipers -- the very breath of battle. The pipers stood at the foot of the hill beating the ground with their feet while playing with fiendish energy. The deep furrow that ran across Wolseley's cheek - a souvenir of the Crimea - grew purple.'

The first attackers were met by heavy fire from the Bapedi defenders who fired from the breastworks at point-blank range - fortunately the Bapedi were not good shots - and then scurried for shelter in the caves and many of the attackers were shot or assegaied in hand-to-hand fighting in the caverns. Captain Lawrell of Wolseley's staff was shot dead from one of these caves. The Swazis darted past the Redcoats and were the first to reach the top. At 10.30 a.m. the 'Fighting Koppie' was taken but, inside its bowels, was still hidden a fearful combination of resolute men, women and children, and dead and wounded. Baker Russell called upon the Royal Engineers to put charges of gun-cotton at the many cave entrances, but the noise of the explosions failed to drive out the defenders and in many instances the Bapedi, having worked in the Kimberley mines, cut the fuses.

When the defenders refused to surrender, the troops and Swazis were all withdrawn and a cordon of men was placed in a trench around the Koppie with the object of starving the enemy out. The remainder of the force retired to camp at about 1 p.m.

The power of Sekukuni had now been broken, but the 'Fighting Koppie' had to be taken and Sekukuni himself captured. The cordon around the Koppie that night was composed of three companies of the 94th Regiment, Ferreira's Horse and Mapoch's Natives.

Fortune often favours the beleaguered and, during the night which was extremely dark, there was a thunderstorm and heavy rain, and while the worn out troops sought to improvise some shelter in their positions, large numbers of Bapedi sallied forth from the cavernous Koppie stabbing and firing at the pickets in a desperate attempt to get away. Captain Henry Nourse of Ferreira's Horse describes the scene very graphically as follows:

'We seemed to be caught in the midst of a human cyclone, with masses of savages charging clean through us, assegaiing our men from all sides, and actually leaping over our heads in their wild efforts to escape from their imprisoned Koppie.'

The scene certainly was one of wild confusion with light- ning flashing like some ghastly beacon, lighting up the scene of the desperate fighting between the Bapedi and the men of the cordon.

Accounts vary as to what had become of Sekukuni himself, but it is generally assumed that he had already taken up a position in a cave above the Stad before the battle. However, if not he certainly escaped during the night and fled to caves above his Stad.

Early the following morning, 29th November, 1879, Captain W. G. Lawrell and Captain J. E. Macaulay, together with the four or five other men killed in the previous day's fighting, were buried at the camp with full military honours. At the same time large numbers of Bapedi, mostly women and children, surrendered after Major Clarke had succeeded in communicating with them and promising that those who gave themselves up would be spared. It was necessary, however, to continue to surround the Koppie as many of the Bapedi refused to give themselves up, including one Mapethla, of the Swazi royal family, who had fled long before to Sekukuni. Mapethla finally surrendered on 2nd December, 1879. It is recorded that a number of Bapedi who refused to come out of the rock fortress died of starvation and thirst in the dark and secret corridors, and readers who have clambered over the 'Fighting Koppie' will appreciate their ultimate fate. The Koppie was littered with dead and an unbearable stench soon came out of the mouths of the caves which were later sealed by the Royal Engineers. Deep dark openings can still be seen and one has to be careful not to slip into some of the seemingly bottomless recesses. Certain of the rock schanzes can still be seen on the eastern side and, on the northern end, the clear traces of three or four grinding places for kaffir corn and maize dating back to the time of the occupation and fortification of the Koppie can be found.

Soon afterwards it was learned from information received from some of the prisoners, and also probably some excellent scouting by officers and men of Ferreira's Horse, that Sekukuni had taken refuge in some caves high up in the Lulu Mountains. On 30th November a party of mounted men under Major Clarke and Colonel Ferreira, together with some of the Bapedi prisoners including one of Sekukuni's brothers, set off in pursuit of Sekukuni. They were followed by a large body of Swazis who overtook the party at the summit of the mountain, where Fort Victoria had now been established and occupied by Native allies.

After much searching the hiding place was discovered about nine miles from Fort Victoria by the Swazis and, after a minor siege, and the withdrawal of the Swazis whom Sekukuni feared would kill him, Sekukuni crawled out of the cave in which he had been located and surrendered on 2nd December, 1879, after Major Clarke had sworn to spare his life. There are conflicting accounts of the actual operations leading up to the capture of Sekukuni, but it does seem clear from the account of Major D. R. Hunt who was a Native Commissioner in Sekukuniland and who had probably gleaned some of his information from old Bapedi, that the presence of Major Clarke and the giving of his word to Sekukuni was instrumental in his being taken alive.

Thus ended the Sekukuni menace which had plagued the Transvaal for so many years. Wolseley had succeeded in defeating Sekukuni and the Bapedi whose losses were considerable. Young Moroamotshe, Sekukuni's son and heir, had fought bravely with his back to a big rock till he had been killed, whilst Umsutu had also been killed. Sekukuni claimed to have lost three of his brothers and eight of his children in the battle. It is difficult to estimate the full extent of the Bapedi losses which, according to Hunt, were very heavy, whilst Lehmann records that a good part of the tribe was exterminated. The Swazi losses appear to have been of the order of about 500 killed and an equal number wounded, with the majority of their casualties having occurred in the hand to hand fighting in the Stad and at the mouths of the caves. There is no doubt, however, that the Stad and the 'Fighting Koppie' could not have been overwhelmed in such a comparatively short space of time had it not been for the fierce Swazi warriors who were able in their large numbers to sweep over the broken ground of the mountain as the European soldiers were unable to do. Anyone who has clambered over the 'Fighting Koppie' or climbed the mountain to the site of Fort Victoria on the summit above the Stad will appreciate the situation. The sheer weight of the Swazis certainly played a big part in overwhelming the well-fortified positions of the Bapedi who must have been greatly surprised at being attacked from the rear with such speed and ferocity, and the European casualties would have been much higher if it had not been for the presence of the Swazi warriors who were the hereditary enemies of the Bapedi. An interesting feature of the victory was the capture of 2 041 rifles and muskets.

The detailed British casualties were as follows:

Killed at the Stad and 'Fighting Koppie' and buried at the camp on the plain:
Captain W. G. Lawrell 4th Hussars, Wolseley's Staff.
Captain J. E. Macaulay 12th Lancers - in command of Transvaal Mounted Rifles.
Cpl P. MacNally 2nd Bn 21st Regiment
Pte H. Donahoe 2nd Bn 21st Regiment
Pte W. Weston 2nd Bn 21st Regiment
Pte Chipps 94th Regiment
Cpl E. Mitchell Border Horse
Killed on the mountain or at the Stad, but buried at Fort Victoria at the top of the mountain:
Lt Alister Campbell, R.N. Swazi Native Contingent
Sgt-Maj. R. Wilson Ferreira's Horse
Pte Wm. Reston 2nd Bn 21st Regiment
QMS N. McLeod Border Horse
Tpr Mackay Border Horse
Tpr P. Matibe Transvaal Mounted Rifles.

The remains of these 13 men were re-interred at the northern end of the 'Fighting Koppie' by Mr. B. P. Margetson and party of the Northern Transvaal Soldiers' Graves Association on 25th December, 1961.

Joseph Lehmann records that three officers were killed and seven wounded; other ranks, seven killed and 43 wounded.

Smith records that three officers were killed and five wounded; other ranks, 10 killed and about 30 wounded. In so far as deaths are concerned, the latter figures appear to be correct.

Smith also records that the numerical distribution for 28th November, 1879, the day of the battle, could not be ascertained, but a total of approximately 3,400 Europeans and 10,000 Natives took part in the campaign. In this connection it must be remembered that, in addition to the two columns that marched on the Stad, garrisons were left at Middelburg, Lydenburg, Fort Burgers, Fort Jellalabad, Fort Weeber, Fort Olifants and Fort Albert Edward.

The total cost of the campaign was 383 000 (UK) Pounds.


Despite the fact that Sir Garnet Wolseley encountered good rains and, accordingly, did not have to contend with the same shortages of water as others before him, and that it was said that horse sickness had been less prevalent that year, there is no doubt that the success of his campaign was the result of very careful and detailed planning and preparation, coupled with the bold characteristic actions of a man of decision. Sir Bartle Frere wrote that 'Sir Garnet Wolseley seems to me to deserve great credit for determining to make the attack at once, and, still more, for his dispositions, which, as far as I can judge, left nothing to be desired in thorough thoughtfulness or completeness, and nothing could be better than the decision, punctuality, and courage with which every movement seems to have been executed.'

Immediately after the capture of Sekukuni, Wolseley issued orders for the dispersal and redistribution of the Transvaal Field Force. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Regiment, was to leave for Pretoria on the 3rd December, 1879; the Swazis and the two companies of the 94th Regiment that had formed part of the Lydenburg column were to return to Lydenburg. Ferreira's Horse was to proceed to Fort Weeber, whilst the Border Horse was to proceed to Middelburg. The other Native contingents were to be disbanded. The main body of Swazis also returned home, somewhat in the mood of a victorious army and are alleged to have carried out a bit of cattle-stealing, etc., on their way home.

The Transvaal Mounted Rifles and Eckersley's Native Contingent were to remain in Sekukuni's country, and these two bodies were to be called the Transvaal Mounted Police. This corps and a small flying column of the 94th Regiment were to garrison Fort Victoria, at the summit of the mountain above Sekukuni's Stad, and another fort, Fort Albert, was to be built at the southern end of the Lulu Mountains. This force was to be under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Murray. Forts Weeber, Burgers and Jellalabad were to be maintained in the meantime.

Sekukuni was brought into camp on 2nd December, 1879, and the following day Wolseley and his staff set off with the captive chief for Pretoria, where they arrived on 9th December. The streets were lined with spectators and a detachment of the King's Dragoon Guards went out to escort the party into Pretoria.

Major Clarke and Captain H. Stewart, with the mounted force, marched from Fort Victoria to Phota's valley to select a site for Fort Albert, whilst the infantry marched to Fort Weeber where the garrison for Fort Albert would be organized. This fort was built at the head of Phota's valley on a circular plateau overhanging the Steelpoort Valley and looking down upon Magnet Heights. In the meantime the troops, including the wounded men made their way back round the Lulu Mountains, and the various forts were gradually abandoned or dismantled as peace and settled conditions slowly returned to the country. Smith tells us that 'the real heroes of the story of the campaigns against the Bapedi, the colourful bands of volunteers, were disbanded on the 31st December, 1879, since their services were no longer required'.

Subsequently, in terms of Article 23 of the Pretoria Convention of 1881, Sekukuni was released and allowed to return to his own country, where he settled temporarily at Manoge, a small stad or village on the western slopes of the Lulu Mountains, but he did not regain his former status as chief of the Bapedi. During his absence his brother, Mampuru, and Ramoroko, the son of one of Sekwati's lesser wives, had temporarily become joint chiefs of the Bapedi. The ambitious Mampuru decided to do away with Sekukuni and with an armed party surrounded him on the night of 13th August, 1882, and assegaied him as he slept under a shelter in front of his hut. Mampuru was eventually caught by the South African Republic authorities and hanged on 22nd November, 1883, for the murder of Sekukuni.

As far as I am aware Sekukuni is buried somewhere on Manganeng, a mountain on the right-hand side of the present road near the site of Fort Mamalube. In conclusion, it is fitting to quote from Major D. R. Hunt:

'Thus Sekukuni's death was violent just as his life had been. He was a thin, fierce looking man. As a child he had seen the Matabele invasion; he had been with his father Sekwati in the northern Transvaal and had known no peace during those four years; neither did he find peace when his father returned to Sekukuniland. He first shows up as a leader when a young man at Phiring, and his seizure of the chieftainship at Mosega is typical of his energy, resource and cunning. His struggle against the rising tide of White occupation and rule was as hopeless as, in those days, it was inevitable.'

TYLDEN, Major G.:"Three Mountains" (Africana Notes and News, March, 1952, vol. IX, no. 2).
HUNT, Major D. R., DSO: "An account of the Bapedi" (Bantu Studies, vol. V, 1931.)
HALL, Dr. A. L., M.A., Sc.D.: "The Bushveld Igneous Complex", etc.
HARRIES, Maj. C. L.: "The Laws and Customs of the Bapedi and Cognate Tribes of the Transvaal", 1929.
MCTOY, Pte. EDWARD D.: "A Brief History of the 13th Regiment (P.A.L.I.) in South Africa", 1880.
LEHMANN JOSEPH: "All Sir Garnet", 1964.
SMITH, KENNETH WYNDHAM: Thesis "The Campaigns against the Bapedi of Sekhukhune, 1877-1879"
(Archives Year Book for South African History, 1967, vol. II).

The last named three have proved invaluable, and more particularly the last one as this is the only complete account of the campaigns against Sekukuni which I have been able to find, i.e. giving in one extremely well-written document a very full account of the Sekukuni campaigns. I am indebted to Mr Smith and have quoted him freely with, I hope, proper acknowledgement.

MONNIG, Dr. H. O.: "The Pedi", 1967.
AYLWARD, ALFRED: "The Transvaal of Today", 1881.
HH.M.S.O. "Narrative of Field Operations", 1881.
UYS, C. J., M.A., D.Litt : "In the Era of Shepstone", 1933.
LEHMANN, OLGA: "Look Beyond the Wind", 1955.
CORRIE, E. V. "The Promised Land", 1884.
MACDONALD, WILLIAM: "Pioneers of the Golden Rand"; "The Romance of the Golden Rand", 1933.
CALLWELL, Maj-Gen. Sir C. E., KCB: "The Memoirs of Maj-Gen. Sir Hugh McCalmont", 1924.
CURSON, Dr H. H. "The History of the Kimberley Regiment", l963.
TYLDEN Major G. "The Armed Forces of South Africa", 1954.
BULPIN, T. V.: "Lost Trails of the Transvaal", 1965.
BULPIN, T. V. and MILLER, PENNY: "Low Veld Trails", 1968.
VAN ROOYEN, T. S.: "Die Verhoudinge tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die Geskiedenis van die Oos-Transvaal tot 1882" (Archives Year Book for S.A. History, 1951, vol. 1).
OTTO, J. C. "Die Sekoekoeni-oorlog tydens die Regering van President Burgers" (M.A. Thesis -- University of S. A., 1934).
EVERETT, Sir HENRY: "The Somerset Light Infantry, 1685 to 1914" (London, 1934)
JOURDAIN, H. F. N., and FRASER, E.: History of the Connaught Rangers in three vols. "The Connaught Rangers, 2nd Battalion, formerly 94th Foot", vol.ll (London, 1926).
NORRIS-NEWMAN, CHARLES L.: "With the Boers in the Transvaal and Orange Free State in 1880-81" (London, 1882).
Transvaal Native Affairs Department: "Short History of the Native Tribes of the Transvaal" (1905).

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