PAST EVENTS:
It was vintage "Gillings" at our June meeting with our former
Chairman, Ken Gillings drawing on his vast knowledge of the Anglo-Boer
War and giving us a talk on "The Battle of Stormberg".
There was no DDH curtain-raiser to start proceedings, but for nearly two
hours our speaker held us spellbound. For although there is very little
written on this battle and it was overshadowed by the British defeats at
Magersfontein and Colenso, it was the third massive disaster to hit the
British in that "Black Week" of December 1899. Its outcome was
to affect British thinking for the rest of the War.
Our speaker started off by giving us a brief history of the North-Eastern
Cape and its relative importance in both British and Boer strategy. He
then went on to describe the key personalities involved. On the British
side there was Maj. Gen. Sir William Forbes Gatacre, a fearless and tireless
leader who drove his men until they literally dropped. On the Boer side
there was Cmdt. Jan Hendrik Olivier, affectionately nick-named "Big
John" both for his stature and courage. He led the Bethulie Cormuando
from the Rourville District of the Orange Free State.
Before the outbreak of hostilities the British had occupied Stormberg Junction
for strategic reasons and had fortified the area. However, when Gen. Buller
arrived at the Cape as supreme commander of the British forces in Southern
Africa, he immediately ordered the withdrawal of the garrison to Queenstown
as he feared another Nicholson's Nek debacle. The area was immediately
occupied by the Boers as part of their invasion of the Cape Colony.
Gen. Gatacre arrived as his troops reached Queenstown and immediately ordered
his troops back to Putterskraal - a small encampment south-east of Molteno
which was the town nearest to the Strormberg. As he could not allow his
communications with Col. French some 200 kms to the north-west of him to
be threatened by the Boers he determined to retake the Junction.
At that stage his forces were stretched to their limit along the Stormberg.
The Kaffrarian Rifles were encamped at Sterkstroom with a small detachment
of Mounted Infantry (M.I.) at Boesmanshoek - a pass over the Bamboesberg
between Sterkstroom and Molteno. At Dordrecht there was an armoured train
manned by the Berkshire Light Infantry plus a few Cape Mounted Police.
Obviously he lacked sufficient firepower to go on the offensive. At the
beginning of December 1899 he only had about 3000 men plus a few 7pdr guns
at his disposal. However on the 5th December 1899 he was reinforced by
the arrival of the 74th and 77th Batteries of the RFA and lst Battalion
of the Royal Scots. Against him there were 3400 burghers plus 6 guns spread
out between Dordrecht, Jamestown, Molteno and Stormberg Junction.
Gatacre's plan was to attack the Stormberg Junction without warning. His
troops would proceed from Putterskraal to Molteno by train and then by
means of a night march along the Stormberg road where he hoped to capure
the Junction.
However by the time he arrived in Molteno at 20h30 on the night of December
9th 1899, his troops had spent the whole day in the blazing sun in the
trucks and were already exhausted. In addition, his orders to a Scout group
at Penhoek Pass to join him in the attack, had not been relayed by the
telegraphist.
At that stage he was advised that the Boers had entrenched themselves at
the foot of the Kesiesberg and at the nek on the approach road to Stormberg
Junction. Bearing in mind the near disaster of the previous week at the
Battle of Modder River where the Boer forces had adopted a similar strategy,
he changed his plan. Instead of the frontal attack, he opted for an outflanking
march up the Steynslurg road to Van Zyl's Farm where he could attack the
Boer positions from the rear.
Such was the chain of his command that virtually nobody other than those
in his immediate vicinity were advised of this change of attack. Even the
rear-guard of his own column which included some artillery and his ambulances
were not aware of the change of plan and marched along the original route
for nearly two hours before the error was discovered. In fact even when
they returned to Molteno they were assured that they were still on the
right track by the Intelligence Officer who also had not been advised of
the change of plan!
Meanwhile back on the Steynsburg road Gatacre had his Infantry marching
with "fixed bayonets at the ready" - an energy sapping execcise
for his already exhausted men. In addition he got lost!. His guides who
professed to know the area overshot the turnoff point by nearly 3 kms so
that although they were behind the Boer positions, they would have to retrace
their steps in order to engage the enemy. However at this stage he gave
his troops an hour's rest, but they were so tired that most of them fell
into a deep sleep and could barely be woken when the march was restarted.
This took place at 02h00 and the exhausted soldiers stumbled along the
deeply ratted track that was to bring them back to their original turnoff
point at 03h45, but he did not realize that he had reached his objective.
It was at this point that some of the starving stragglers decided to indulge
in some sheep-rustling from Van Zyl's farm and the subsequent sniping attack
by the irate owner caused several casualties. But at this stage several
events happened simultaneously. In the predawn light the column of troops
was spotted by a lone Boer at ablutions and the alarm was raised.
The Boer laager became scene of turmoil as the burghers grabbed their rifles
and ran for the ridges lining the track along which Gatacre's weary column
was wending its way. Using the sangars previously built by the British
garrison on the approach hills to Stormberg Junction, they begun to fire
wildly into the valley below.
The column staggered to a halt and Gatacre ordered the Royal Irish Rifles
(RIR) to seize the hill behind the ridge ahead of them. Only three Coys
obeyed and the rest, together with the Northumberland Fusiliers rushed
towards the slopes of the Kesiesberg only to find their advance blocked
by a long rocky cliff or krans. Finding themselves pinned down against
this krans and dead tired by this 24-hour "labour under arms"
and unsupported by covering fire, many of the British soldiers went to
sleep! A few hundred made their way up through gaps in the cliff face to
reach the summit, but the rest ran back to the shelter of a nearby donga
where they took cover behind the horses for the guns.
Meanwhile the RIR held their ground, but required support to clear the
nek and the kopje that descends down to it from the Kesieberg. The Mounted
Infantry came up on their left thereby allowing them to check any further
Boer advance from the north-east. As soon as the column came under fire
the Artillery took up a position on a low ridge to the left of the nek
but had to abandon one of their guns which was bogged down as they skirted
the donga. But they were blinded by the rising sun and shelled their own
men thereby forcing those troops that had managed to scale the krans to
retreat back to the base of the hill and retire to the donga.
When Gatacre saw the men streaming back to the donga there was nothing
for it but to order a general retreat and try to reform back at Molteno.
Accordingly, two Battalions fell back under each others covering fire while
the RIR withdrew across the open plain covered by the Mounted Infinitry.
The Boers observing this withdrawal concentrated their fire on the British
column and brought their Krupp guns into action. A short sharp artillery
duel developed, but the noise of the firing alerted the two other commandos
that had laargered on the western flank of the column and they too began
firing at the British. Once again the Mounted Infantry and the Artillery
covered the retreat and when the stream of fleeing soldiers ceased, Gatacre
assumed that all his troops were safe and ordered the return march to Molteno.
What he did not realize was that there were still over 600 unwounded soldiers
fast asleep at the foot of the Kesieberg. Later when they woke up, they
had no option but to surrender to the Boers and become prisoners-of-war.
Fortunately for the British it was Sunday and Olivier would not allow his
commandos to encircle and entrap the retreating column and apart from a
few desultory shots, the British escaped unscathed. The total British casualties
were 10 officers and 28 other ranks killed and 51 wounded, but it was the
surrender of the 634 officers and men that was so calamitous. The Boer
cnua'ties were 8 killed and 26 wounded.
At Molteno, the British regrouped and retired to Sterkstroom, but some
Mounted Infantry were left at Cyfergat to keep an eye on Molteno. The resultant
stalemate lasted a couple of months with one more attempt by the British
to take the Junction on 23rd February 1900. Once again they were thwarted
by the Boers and it was only when Gen. Cronje surrendered at Paardeberg
that the Boer forces finally withdrew. Stormberg eventually became a British
stronghold, but again was subjected to guerrilla attacks in the later stages
of the Anglo-Boer War.
After yet another interesting question time, our new Chairman Paul Kilmartin took the honour of conveying the meetings thanks for a most instructive and entertaining evening.
FUTURE EVENTS: From this newsletter onwards it is proposed to cover
this information on a separate sheet which can be used as a poster and
to diarise future events.
BATTLEFIELDS' TOUR: Details will be included with this newsletter. Please remember to 'phone Ken on (031)2670013 (w) as soon as possible and also advise the Royal Hotel in Ladysmith of your booking.
Dr Ingrid Machin
Secretary: Durban Branch
S.A.MILITARY HISTORY SOCIETY
4 Hadley,101 Manning Road,Glenwood,Durban,4001
Telephone: (031) 21 3983