Our March meeting saw fellow-member; Bill Brady at his brilliant best.
The subject of his talk was "The channel Dash - 1942"
and using colour slides, overhead projeccions and videos he managed to
achieve that atmosphere of fury and betrayal that marked one of the worst
British fiascoes of WW2. One could not help feeling Churchill's utter flustration
as one snafu followed another allowing the German battle-cruisers, Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser, Prinz Eugen to steam up the English
Channel in broad daylight and escape to the relative safety of German home
waters. This "Channel Dash" as it was to become known, dealt
a severe blow to British pride, nearly bringing down the War Cabinet and
at the same time providing Nazi propaganda with a massive morale booster
for the German population.
Our speaker started off by outlining Hitler's reasons for ordering these
German capital ships which at that stage were based in Brest, to embark
on such a foolhardy mission. Apart from America's entry into the War in
late '41 and the difficulty of protecting these capital ships from the
RAF either in the Atlantic or in port, Hitler was more concerned about
the Arctic convoys delivering vital war supplies to the Russians at a time
when the major thrust of the German offensive was his Eastern Front. He
was obsessed with the strategic value of Norway and wanted to concentrate
all the capital ships he could muster in that sector. Also he felt sure
that the British would never anticipate such a daring plan....
To the German Naval Command the concept of going through the Straits of
Dover in daylight seemed suicidal until it was realized that to go through
that section in darkness would mean that the ships would have to leave
Brest in daylight, thereby alerting the RN and/or RAF who were maintaining
a dawn to dusk watch on the port. This would allow the British sufficient
time to mount a combined operation capable of defeating the three German
warships. Hitler had promised full air support and, although it was to
be a risky operation, to stay in Brest was even more so. Hitler's final
arm-twister was the threat of dismantling these capital ships and mounting
their guns as shore batteries! The German Naval Command had no option but
to agree.
Our speaker then went on to assess the British preparations. Through their
intelligence network, they knew that a break-out was imminent, but as Hitler
had surmised they never thought the Germans would ever attempt an escape
through the English Channel let alone in broad daylight. All they had to
counter this seemingly remote threat were six antiquated Fairey Swordfish
torpedo bombers stationed at Manston in Kent, nine MTB's at Ramsgate and
six 20 year old destroyers at Harwich. After the disasters in the Far East
the British Admiralty was not prepared to commit any capital ships to the
English Channel where they could be sunk by the Luftwaffe. If it came to
the push, they were going to rely on Bomber Command even though the latter
were only trained in high level fixed target bombing techniques. Incidentally,
the only aircraft capable of sinking these German warships at that time
were the Bristol Beaufort torpedo bombers which were stationed in Scotland
and their squadron was not even placed on alert!
"Operation Cerebus" as it was code-named by the Germans began
at 22h15 on the 11th February 1942 when the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and
Pnnz Eugen quietly slipped out of Brest harbour and raced up the English
Channel escorted by six destroyers, ten torpedo boats, numerous E-boatss
and an air umbrella comprising 300 day and night fighters. Due to a combination
of bad luck and rank inefficiency on the part of the crews of the aircraft
and submarine on watch outside Brest, the German flotilla was able to win
a 300 mile start and were nearly into the Straits of Dover, before they
were "stumbled on" by a pair of Spitfires on patrol shortly after
l0h00 the following morning.
Even then when one of the Spitfire pilots broke radio silence, his report
was disbelieved by the RAF High Command. Fortunately the ATC concerned
insisted on speaking to the AOC, Air Vice- Marshall Leigh-Mallory, who
at that time was reviewing a Belgian Air Force unit and who was eventually
brought to the 'phone. He was very irate at the interruption, but when
he realized that it must be the German warships he ordered "Operation
Fuller" to be executed. Unfortunately the Intelligence Officer in
charge of the plan had locked it in a safe and had gone off on leave!
At 12h15 right on schedule the German flotilla reached the narrowest part
of the Channel at Dover, but were able to steam through safely because
all the British had at that point were some antiquated 13.5" heavy
guns with a fire rate of one shell per 5 minutes. The Germans were out
of range before these guns could be brought to bear. From this stage onwards
the British "battle plan" degenerated into a series of unco-ordinated
attacks and improvisations. First, there was the Swordfish torpedo attack
- due to lack of adequate fighter support only three aircraft rnanaged
to penetrate the German fighter and flak barrage and launch their torpedoes.
All missed and all the aircraft were shot down. Then came the MTB's, but
they were too slow to catch the fast moving German warships and they had
to launch their torpedoes at maximum range giving the Germans more than
enough time to take evasive action. After a long delay during which time
all sorts of administrative bungles occurred, the Beauforts were finally
deployed, but once again due to lack of fighter cover, they were obliged
to drop their torpedoes at maximum range with similar results. Then Bomber
Command sent in 647 aircraft, but they did not even know what their target
was supposed to be! Finally the six 20-year old destroyers which had been
delayed while negotiating a minefield arrived on the scene, but could not
penetrate the defence cordon. In addition they were severely attacked from
both sides and, after launching their torpedoes at maximum range had to
limp back to port. Once again the German warships had more than enough
time to take evasive action. However, in the late afternoon two of the
Germans warships were finally damaged by mines. The Scharnhorst hit two
mines and the Gneisenau one, but both ships were able to make port safely.
In Germany "Operation Cerebus" was hailed as a great naval victory,
but in Britain, coming so soon after the losses of the Prince of Wales,
Repulse, Barham and Ark Royal and shortly before the Fall of Singapore,
it made "Black Febraary 1942" the lowest point in the entire
War. But it did have a positive effect in the long run - it established
the appropriate "Combined Operations" procedures which would
have a devastating effect on Germany in the remaining years of WW2.
After our usual well-informed question time, all that remained was for Major Keith Archibald to thank our speaker for a well-researched and well-presented talk.
BATTLEFIELDS' TOUR: "Ladysmith Siege Sites" September 12/131998- DIARISE!
AGM: Our AGM will be held on 9th April 1998 in line with the other Branches. Please get your nominations in for a new Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Scribe and 4 Committee Members. Please complete the attached nomination sheet and eturn it to Ken Gillings as soon as possible.