The meeting of 11 th July 1991 began with a short explanation of the Schlieffen plan, presented by Mr Avram Pelunksy. Mr Pelunsky explained how the plan evolved from the 1890s German realization that a war would need to be fought on an offensive basis. General von Schlieffen failed to grasp, when formulating the plan, that attacking France through Dutch and Belgian territory would have political repercussions. The plan was modified by General Moltke to exclude Holland from the route of attack. By 1914, no specific cause for war was evident until Arch Duke Ferdinand's assassination. When the Russians mobilised and the French mobilised in support of Russia, the Germans declared war on Russia while advancing through Luxembourg to France, thus opening their offensive on two fronts. The principal reason for the failure of the Schlieffen plan was that the Germans resisted the French counter-attack in the south, instead of withdrawing to lead the French on into the German defensive positions. The war developed into a war of attrition in which both sides' mobility was limited until the end.

The Chairman thanked Nr Pelunsky and introduced the main speaker, Mr L A Wildenboer who addressed the meeting on the subject of "Sannaspost". Mr Wildenboer provided four reasons for his particular interest in the battle, namely "that it was the first Boer victory after a long series of defeats, that 5 Victoria Crosses were awarded, that it was the first Boer victory resulting from the new Commando strategy, and that it is an excellent example of the unpredictability of warfare".

The Boer leaders' Council of War had recently decided to abandon conventional warfare in favour of the deployment or Commandos. In line with this decision, General de Wet decided to attack the waterworks at Sannaspost where 200 British soldiers were garrisoned. De Wet planned a two-phase attack. The first phase involved frightening the British into flight towards Bloemfontein with the intention or capturing them on route. The second phase included cutting off the water supply to Bloemfontein and then going on to attack General Broadwood at Thaba 'Nchu.

At 17h00 on 28th March 1900, De Wet left Brandfort with approximately 1600 men. They succeeded in covering the 94 kms to the Koornspruit Drift near to Sannaspost by 04h00 on 31st March, where De Wet concealed approximately 400 men between the river banks and sent 1200 men further on to high ground overlooking the British position.

In the meantime, General Broadwood had left Thaba 'Nchu to return to Bloemfontein. He arrived with his column of approximately 2000 men at Sannaspost at 03h30 on March 31st and the soldiers encamped without establishing whether or not Boer soldiers were present in the area.

De Wet began shelling the British position at daybreak and Broadwood's column was ordered immediately to retreat towards Bloemfontein via the drift in the Koornspruit where De Wet's men were waiting.

De Wet found himself facing 2200 British troops instead of the 200 he had anticipated, in spite of which the Boers managed to capture 30 wagons and 200 men in the drift before Broadwood realised what was happening.

The Boers opened fire once the trap was sprung and Broadwood's column swung around to retreat to the station building at Sannaspost in an attempt to consolidate their position. Volunteers managed to save six guns under the direction of Major Phipps-Hornby who was awarded a V.C. for his role in the action.

At this stage, Broadwood decided to try an outflanking attack from the south, but De Wet, anticipating this possibility, sent men out to hold the attackers at bay. At 10h00 Broadwood decided to withdraw towards Bloemfontein by another route under the artillery cover of Phipps-Hornsby's guns.

The battle could be heard from Bloemfontein and reinforcements sent out under General Colville only reached Sannaspost at 11h30, by which time De Wet had cut off the water, removed the prisoners, mustered his own men, and moved off in a successful southerly attack against the British at Reddersburg.

De Wet had had the advantage of surprise. In addition to this the Boers were better armed and had a far better knowledge of the countryside and conditions. Altogether De Wet captured 428 British soldiers, killed 30 and wounded 113 in return for the loss of 7 of his own men killed and 11 wounded. He also captured over 1200 draught animals and numerous guns.

The victory boosted Boer morale and established De Wet as a hero. The important lessons learned by both sides were: the value of careful planning; the value of mobility and surprise; the value of proper reconnaissance; and the effectiveness of the Commando system.

Mr Terry Colins thanked Mr Wildenboer for his beautifully illustrated and fascinating talk.

Book Sale - Proceeds

General Pretorius wishes to convey his thanks to members of the Society for their donations of books and for their support on International Museum Day, 18th May 1991. The book sale raised R2928-45 towards Museum funds.

Day tour - Sunday 25th AUGUST

The day tour to forts in the Diamond Hill battle area and to Sammy Marks house, will commence at 09h00. Participants are kindly requested to assemble at the Oukraal Mine Roadhouse on the R104, whence the convey will depart. Members should provide their own packed lunches.

Directions to the assembly point are as follows: Take the N4 freeway from Pretoria to the Boschkop/Donkerhoek off-ramp (which is 17.8 kms from the N1/N4 junction). Turn left and then right onto the R104, proceed to assembly point.

Future Talks

August 8th - Mrs J M Copley - "The Third Battle of Ypres - 1917"

September 12th - Prof Maxwell-Mahon - "Lawrence of Arabia: The Damascus Campaign"

Jennifer Copley