Our speaker on 11 November 2010 was fellow-member Mr Simon Norton, who gave us another one of his well-illustrated presentations, augmented by video and audio clips. His topic for the evening was Operation Rolling Thunder: The Bombing of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. He pointed out that the code name for the bombing campaign had its origin in words from a verse from the hymn "O Lord My God, How Great Thou Art".
Mr Norton introduced his talk by describing the events which had preceded the Vietnam War. The history of Vietnam dates back to 1300BC and for much of its existence it was ruled by various Chinese dynasties (207BC - 938AD). Vietnam's history as a political entity is very fragmentary, but the country's inhabitants acquired the reputation of being a tough, resilient and warlike nation, for, amongst others, successfully repelling a number of Chinese invasions as well as three Mongolian invasions between 1255 and 1285. Western contact dates back to 166BC (merchants from the Roman Empire); 1292 (Marco Polo) and from the early 16th century contact with the Portuguese and Dutch who vied for trading rights and commercial interests.
French contact and influence, however, date back to 1788, and this led to an influx of French merchants and missionaries. The result was a confused period of popular uprisings by the local inhabitants against the foreigners, or Christians, and even an attempt to install a pro-Roman Catholic regime. The French conquered Indochina in a long and bitter war from 1859-1885. The Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and the unpopular conscription of some 100 000 Annamese into the French Army in the First World War resulted in an upsurge of nationalism amongst the indigenous population of the region. A mutiny of the colonial army's Yen Bai Garrison followed in February 1930 and rapidly spread to other parts of French Indochina (today Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). The bloody repression of the mutiny led to much bitterness and hatred on the part of the local populace towards their colonial overlords.
During the Second World War Indochina was occupied by Imperial Japanese forces, who kept the French Vichy administration in place as a Japanese puppet regime. In March 1945 the French administration was ousted from office when it was discovered that it was holding secret talks with the Free French forces. In its place the Japanese eventually installed a nominally Vietnamese government under the leadership of the Emperor Bao Dai. The newly-created autonomous state of Vietnam consisted of Tonkin, Annam and Cochin-China. With the Japanese surrender in August 1945, a power vacuum existed, which was exploited to the full by the Communist-dominated Vietminh, to promote civil disobedience and chaos. Bao Dinh abdicated on the 22nd August 1945 and the Vietminh under Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam independent - as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. All former treaties with France were annulled. British forces arrived in October to disarm the Japanese and restore order. Due to the chaotic conditions in the post-war Pacific Theatre, the allied occupation troops were slow in arriving and the British were forced to re-arm the Japanese troops to help to restore and maintain order, but under British command.
France, however, was intent on restoring its Asian colonial empire and the first French troops arrived in 1946 to enforce French political suzerainty. Fighting between the French and Vietnamese (Vietminh) broke out, which led to negotiations to try and reach a political solution. A provisional cease-fire agreement was concluded in March 1946. During the next nine years the French became embroiled in an exhausting and costly war of attrition against the Vietminh. Inexorably they were forced to cede control of the country to a shadowy and more nimble foe - the Vietminh fought a classic guerilla war along the principles of the great Chinese military strategist, Sun Tzu. The French on the other hand, tried to maintain control of the ground and to force the Vietminh to fight a conventional war where the orthodox rules of land warfare applied. Paradoxically, the same mistakes were made by the French. During the disastrous Fall of France in 1940 -French military thinking was again outdated and again they tried to fight a modern war based on the rules of warfare that dated from, and dominated a different time and age.
Despite deploying an army averaging about 150 000 men, armed with modern weapons and technology, the French were not able to defeat the highly motivated Communist foes. In 1954 the French were soundly defeated in the distant and secluded Nam Youm Valley (on the Laotian border named after the river traversing the length of the valley) far away from Hanoi, at a small hamlet that no Westerner - nor most Vietnamese for that matter - have ever heard of. That foreign and distant place was called Muong Thanh. It entered the history books as Diên Biên Phu (lit. meaning: "Departmental centre of the regional border administration"). Diên Biên Phu was France's Isandhlwana - another defeat of a major colonial power at the hands of its rather unwilling colonial subjects - but this time in the post-WWII era, characterised by decolonising wars of liberation that entered military terminology as the "savage wars of peace". In July of that year the French Premier signed an armistice at Geneva in terms of which Vietnam was temporarily divided into two autonomous states (pending the outcome of a future general election to determine the democratically elected rulers of the country), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam north of the seventeenth parallel, and the Republic of Vietnam in the south.
America's post-war foreign policy fully reflected President Harry Truman's doctrine of vigorously containing the expansion of Communism worldwide in the post-WWII era. Under the presidency of John F. Kennedy the American military became heavily involved in Vietnam - initially to maintain the status quo, rather than defeat the Communist North. Due to the American Defence Forces' reliance on technological innovations, the United States Air Force played a preponderantly important role in the campaign, be it bombing, interdiction, support or supply missions. Initially American material aid was provided to help South Vietnam's President Diem win his own war against the war of aggression that the Communist North was waging against his country. When the Americans supported the coup to depose President Diem (and his subsequent assassination), they became inextricably tied to his successors - and inexorably drawn into the fighting itself. The coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem had unleashed a maelstrom of political unrest and Communist victories. Coup followed coup in Saigon as ARVN generals vied for power. There were seven governments in Saigon in 1964, three between 16 August and 3 September alone.
Mr Norton explained that things might have been very different if President John F. Kennedy had not been assassinated. His successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, made the decision to prevent the fall of South Vietnam to the Communists at all costs - even if it meant that America would be at war. In terms of America's containment policy it was of paramount importance to stop the fall of South Vietnam to the Communists, as the rest of Asia could easily follow - the "Domino Principle" - the cornerstone of the containment doctrine.
In setting the mood of the evening's talk, Mr Norton, let us listen to the popular song of the Sixties, "Downtown" by Petula Clark. He explained that it had a particular relevance as the American bomber pilots jocularly referred to bombing missions to the Hanoi-Haiphong area in North Vietnam as "going downtown". The speaker also referred to a particular book on the Vietnam War that he has read more than once that amply illustrates what the air war was all about (The book is aptly titled Going Downtown: The War Against Hanoi and Washington, by Jack Broughton, 1988).
Initially President Johnson's policy in Vietnam was that "the United States, at the request of the Republic of South Vietnam and in accordance with our obligations under the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), is helping South Vietnam to defend its freedom with military advisors, ammunition and material. It is not engaged in the war and does not intend to be". That illusion was soon shattered. On 2 August 1964 an attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the USS Maddox (DD-731) in the Gulf of Tonkin, followed by the former and the USS Turner Joy (DD-951) on the 3rd, served as a catalyst for the retaliatory bombing raid on the torpedo boats and their home base. Johnson's approval of the mission, accompanied by the statement, "We seek no wider war", can be seen as the turning point in American Foreign Policy.
Mr Norton described the American Presidential Election Campaign in which President Johnson indicated that he intended to stay out of the "shooting war in Vietnam" and "not get tied down in a land war in Asia". His Republican opponent was Senator Barry Goldwater who publically spoke of using nuclear weapons, with a mixture of casualness and a kind of cowboy bravado, which deeply disturbed the voters.
Mr Norton then discussed America's position as a major super-power and showed some film footage to underscore the topic. He analysed the war situation from Ho Chi Minh's perspective, who recognized the USA's vulnerability and saw that they lacked the mental willpower and fortitude to see through a long war. He also realised that America's infatuation with the news media brought the war right into every American family's living room - in full-colour - and that this daily exposure to the horror of war and the conditions on the battlefield would have a negative impact on the voters - which it did.
After the American Presidential Election - which President Johnson won - the North Vietnamese Communists retaliated by ordering the South Vietnamese Communist insurgent forces, the Vietcong, to attack compounds that housed US military advisors throughout South Vietnam. This resulted in the Americans escalating the level of involvement - the decision to bomb the North "back to the stone age" and the landing of American troops to participate in the fighting itself. The first American troops' arrival, was a symbolic amphibious landing operation with US Marines stepping ashore through the surf at Da Nang. The level of engagement steadily grew until at the war's peak, around 550 000 troops (inclusive of the US Air Force and the US Navy) were deployed at any given time up to the gradual disengagement and final pull-out in 1973.
On 7 February 1965 the US 2nd Air Division (later Seventh Air Force), US Navy, and Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) commenced bombing North Vietnam in a bombing campaign code-named "Operation Rolling Thunder". The four objectives of the operation, (which evolved over time) were: To boost the sagging morale of the Saigon regime in the South; to persuade the Hanoi regime (North Vietnam) to cease its support for the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam without committing ground forces into Communist North Vietnam; to destroy North Vietnam's transportation system, industrial base, and air defences; and to interdict the flow of men and material into South Vietnam. The achievement of these objectives was hamstrung by both the restraints imposed upon the US and its allies by political directives and by the military aid and assistance received by North Vietnam from its Communist allies, viz the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The campaign lasted more than three years, until cessation on 1 November 1968, a period of 44 months.
The operation resulted in high attritional rates in both aircraft, pilots and navigators / weapons systems officers. Physical conditions such as weather and distance to target, infrastructure and US military operational protocol limited the flying time as well as the time spent over the target, to a set time-frame which made US operations very predictable, thereby assisting the North Vietnamese air and ground defences to accurately predict the targeted areas and prepare their defences accordingly. Due to these peculiar combat and operational circumstances, 506 U.S. Air Force, 397 Navy, and 19 Marine Corps aircraft were lost over or near North Vietnam. During the 44-month time-frame of the operation, of the 745 crewmen shot down, the U.S. Air Force recorded 145 rescued, 255 killed, 222 captured (23 of whom died in captivity), and 123 missing. Figures on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps casualties are less accurate. Approximately 454 Naval aviators were killed, captured, or are missing during combined operations over North Vietnam and Laos.
Between March 1965 and November 1968, aircraft of the U.S. Air Force had flown 153,784 attack sorties against North Vietnam, while the Navy and Marine Corps had added another 152,399. On 31 December 1967, the Department of Defence announced that 864,000 tons of American bombs had been dropped on North Vietnam during Rolling Thunder, compared with 653,000 tons dropped during the entire Korean Conflict and 503,000 tons in the Pacific Theatre during the Second World War. Estimates (dated 1 January 1968) determined that damage inflicted in the north totalled $534 million in physical destruction and damage to capital assets such as factories, bridges and infrastructure. It was estimated that the North Vietnamese population suffered approximately 90 000 casualties for the 44-month period, 72,000 of whom were civilians.
The destruction was not as total as American survey of targets indicated. The North Vietnamese were masters of improvisation - destroyed spans of bridges were not replaced, but roadways were constructed just below the water's surface, making it impossible to observe from the air. In areas hard-hit by the bombing, industries were decentralised to rural areas or simply moved underground. Non-essential civilians in urban areas were evacuated en masse to rural areas. Armies of labourers were conscripted to either help in clearing bombed areas or to act as porters to move supplies (military, food or medicine) surreptitiously via a network of hidden roads over thousands of kilometres to the south to supply the Vietcong. The network of trails became known as the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" and was the main artery that kept the guerrilla war going - a marvel of determination, fortitude, engineering and logistics. With all the modern technology at its disposal, the US Army and Air Force were unable to interdict it effectively for the duration of the Vietnam War. Even the lowly bicycle became a weapon in the North Vietnamese arsenal; a single bicycle and a single porter (and his relays along the route) could move over a hundred kilograms of rice surreptitiously along these hidden pathways from the north to the southernmost point, the Mekong Delta, without being detected. And there were literally thousands of them - a veritable army of ants.
The North Vietnamese managed - with generous Soviet material assistance and Chinese manpower - to build up a network of anti-aircraft defences that was possibly the greatest concentration of its kind anywhere in the world at the time, and particularly in the Red River Delta, around Hanoi and the major port city, Haiphong. The North Vietnamese realised quite early on that gaining air superiority over U.S. forces was impossible, with a policy of air deniability the only solution. At the beginning of the campaign, North Vietnam possessed approximately 1 500 anti-aircraft weapons, most of which were of the light 37mm and 57mm variety. Within one year, however, the U.S. estimated that the number had grown to over 5 000 guns, including 85mm and 100mm radar-directed weapons. The deployment of SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) had American pilots in a quandary: either approach targets at higher altitudes (to avoid anti-aircraft fire) and become prey to SAMs, or fly lower to avoid the missiles and become the target of anti-aircraft batteries. The nature of the gradual escalation had given Hanoi time to adapt to the situation. By 1967, North Vietnam had formed an estimated 25 SAM battalions (with six missile launchers each) which rotated among approximately 150 sites. With the assistance of the Soviet Union, the North Vietnamese had also quickly integrated an early warning radar system of more than 200 facilities which covered the entire country, tracking incoming U.S. raids, and then coordinating SAMs, anti-aircraft batteries, and MiGs to attack them. During 1967 alone, the second full year of Rolling Thunder operations, 362 U.S. aircraft had been lost over North Vietnam. (208 Air Force, 142 Navy and 12 Marine Corps). The North Vietnamese Air Force was initially also a major thorn in the side of the American aerial might and gave a good account of themselves, which came as a major shock to the American pilots and aviators, who viewed their morale, training, tactics and equipment as superior to that of the Communists. It took a major re-adjustment of mindset, tactical doctrine and weapons to enable the Americans to gain aerial superiority over the enemy's fighters and pilots, but at a cost.
The Americans hoped that their air campaign would provide a political solution by forcing the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. The tool to achieve this, the American politicians believed, was the air campaign conducted by a veritable armada of aircraft and aircraft types - from eight-engined B-52 strategic bombers flying from US bases in Thailand and the Philippines, USAF F-105 Thunderchiefs from bases in South Vietnam and USN/Marine Corps A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantoms, amongst others, flying from aircraft carriers in the South China Sea.
Mr Norton showed some video footage of pilots who actually participated in Rolling Thunder. He explained that like air crew everywhere in the world, the Americans who participated on the aerial campaign were also very superstitious - many sported moustaches which they fervently believed to be a good luck omen and protected them from becoming casualties as long as they sported these age-old military symbols of daring and dash. Our speaker, however, pointed out that to be shot down over North Vietnam was a fate worse than death, as the captured pilots and aviators were incarcerated under the most harrowing of conditions. Some were captured by enraged civilians who maltreated them or militia who summarily executed them. The "prisons" themselves were hell-holes where many prisoners were tortured to extract confessions of their "war crimes" against the Vietnamese people. On average the POWs shot down during Operation Rolling Thunder spent over five years being incarcerated in North Vietnam. One of these pilots was the Republican Party's presidential candidate for the US Presidential Election held in 2009, Senator John McCain III, who was shot down in a Skyhawk over Hanoi, after being hit by a Russian SAM, on 26 October 1967. He spent 5 1/2 years as a POW before being repatriated.
President Johnson micro-managed the air war, denying the Air Force, Navy and Marines certain targets near the Chinese border, around Hanoi, Haiphong and the Delta, for fear of international incidents that might escalate the war. Film footage was shown of President Johnson and his top aides and advisors during the war and their various roles explained in detail by the speaker. The Secretary of Defence in both the President Kennedy and Johnson Administrations was Robert McNamara (who passed away in July 2009, aged 73), who was one of the strongest advocates of the American involvement in the Vietnam War. By 1967 he was deeply depressed by the lack of success of Operation Rolling Thunder to halt the flow of supplies and infiltration into the South, the sustainability of the North's economy or influence Hanoi's belief and commitment to final victory. The micro-management and the impromptu decisions by the politicians, as well as their adherence to the limited goals entailed in American foreign policy, were simply not reconcilable with the military's goal of total victory. The conundrum was: How to defeat Hanoi with defeating North Vietnam. McNamara was on the verge of a nervous breakdown and left the administration on 29 February 1968. McNamara resigned his position and was replaced by Clark Clifford (Secretary of State Dean Rusk, himself an ardent advocate of the bombing campaign, took over the rest of his functions), who was chosen because of his personal friendship with Johnson and his diametrically opposite views to those of McNamara. In 1967 he had written to President Johnson: "The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring a thousand non-combatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny, backward nation into submission is an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one."
Early in 1968 the Americans claimed important victories in which they had forced the enemy to retreat into Cambodia and Laos. But the Communists did not see it as a defeat, only a temporary setback, and set about destroying the Americans' false sense of victory and security. January was the Buddhist New Year (Tet) and an official truce was usually observed at this time. On the 30th of January 1968 the North Vietnam Army and the Vietcong launched an offensive all over the South, which has been described as "a major turning point in the war". Although it was a military defeat for the Communists and did not result in a popular uprising as was hoped, it however, was a significant psychological victory abroad. For the Americans it resulted in a major reverse, morally and diplomatically. The media coverage of the horrors of the fighting split American public opinion and anti-war sentiments escalated meteorically. The offensive put paid to the Americans' claim that the bombing campaign was a major deterrent and it was successful in interdicting war material and supplies from North Vietnam to the Communists in the South. It was a major propaganda coup for the North Vietnamese and although the American claim that the bombing forced the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table, the Communists did it in the sure knowledge that the Americans had not defeated them and that their resoluteness would tip the scales eventually in their favour. President Johnson decided not to stand for re-election and the United States of America was forced to negotiate with an enemy whom they did not seem able to defeat. Within five years the Americans would withdraw unconditionally and in 1975 Vietnam became a unified country again - under the political control of Hanoi and as a Communist bulwark in Southeast Asia.
After the usual question and answer session, the Vice-Chairman, Derrick O'Reilly, thanked our speaker for a very interesting and most informative talk and presented him with the customary gift.
MEMBERS
It is with great sadness that we have to inform members that the Cape Town Branch had lost two of its members within the space of three weeks. The first was Dr Heinz-Georg Migeod, who was one of our longest-surviving members, who passed away on 18 November. He was born in 1918 and was 92 years of age, and would have turned 93 in February. He is survived by his wife Helmtraud, who lives in Somerset West. The three children, a daughter and two sons, all live in Germany. Dr Migeod, who served with the Luftwaffe, was shot down by a South African pilot with whom he subsequently became firm friends. The SAAF Museum at Ysterplaat has dedicated an exhibition to their memory and the event in question.
The second was Mrs Gloria Hutchinson. Gloria will be remembered for her regular attendance of society meetings, interest in all matters military - historically and socially - and the fact that she was the friendly lady, immaculately dressed, who always had time to chat to fellow-members at the meetings. She was a resident of Rosedale for 11 years and also the 1st Lt (2IC) of the Admiral Halifax Shellhole (situated at Rosedale). During the Second World War she served in the SWANS and commanded a section in the Signals Branch, and frequently carried signals between the mainland and Robben Island. Her photo appears in the book on the history of the SWANS. She was born in 1924 in Scotland and was married to Capt (SAN) W.J.J. Hutchinson, who was a well-known Naval Officer in his own right as well as the fact that he was the commanding officer of the SAS Tafelberg during the operational phase of its career. Capt. & Mrs Hutchinson were blessed with three daughters and a son. Gloria would have turned 87 on 18 January 2011.
We mourn their passing in the sure knowledge that in their respective family circles and amongst their friends their memory will live for evermore....
Only a very few members have not yet paid their subscriptions for 2010. The four members, whose membership dues for 2010 are still outstanding, will be contacted individually by the Treasurer. (A payment by cheque for the amount of R60 was received a few months ago, but unfortunately without the personal details of the member in question. The renewal advice was not completed and we have no idea whose subscription it was. If YOU paid by way of an ABSA cheque, please contact the Treasurer, contact details below.)
BRANCH MATTERS
Concerning the heritage issue discussed in the November newsletter, it can be reported that two committee members, CDR Mac Bisset and Johan van den Berg, acted as respondents in the Ministerial Appeal Tribunal Hearing (CPA). The matter concerns the Cape Town Branch's objection to the proposed erection of a complex of multi-storied and split-level commercial structures between the Fort and Grainger Bay. The development forms part of the Grainger Bay Precinct within the V&A Waterfront and will compromise the historical integrity of the Fort if the development is to go ahead in its present proposed form. The outcome and decision of the Tribunal have not yet been communicated to the Society.
FORTHCOMING PROGRAMMES: (JANUARY, THIRD THURSDAY of month)
JANUARY, 20 JANUARY 2011: South African Air Defence Artillery, Yesterday and Today, by Brig Gen John Del Monte and Maj Vidius Archer.
Our speakers, fellow-member Gen Del Monte, and Maj Vidius Archer, CO of the Cape Garrison Artillery, will give us an overview of the role and history of SA's air defence artillery in the 20th century to the present. Gen Del Monte will focus his talk on the history of the unit and Maj Archer on the current situation and the latest developments.
(FEBRUARY onwards SECOND THURSDAY of month for rest of year)
FEBRUARY - 10 February: The Scottish Jacobite Uprising, The Cameronians, The Battle of Dunkeld and Religious Freedom, by The Reverend (Dr) David Christie (D.Th.).
Our speaker, the Rev. Dr. Christie, is a professional soldier turned man of the cloth, who served with the famous Scottish regiment, The Cameronians, until their disbandment in 1968. After an illustrious military career he emigrated to South Africa and qualified himself as a Presbyterian minister. Being passionate about Scottish history, having obtained a D.Th. on the subject of Scottish history and religion, and the role that The Cameronians played in both, he is undoubtedly well-qualified to relate events that took place in Scotland during the 17th century, a period of great bloodshed, upheaval and turmoil. The subject of the evening's talk will take place against the background of the 17th/18th Century Jacobite Uprisings that started in 1688 and intermittently carried on for over 50 years, well into the 18th Century! The Jacobite Uprising in Scotland commenced in 1689 and a series of bloody battles were fought at Killiecrankie (27 July 1689), Dunkeld (21 August 1689) and Cromdale (30 April-1 May 1690). The Cameronians were raised during this tumultuous period and the role that the regiment played in the successful defence of Dunkeld and the routing of the numerical superior Jacobite forces will be covered in the evening's talk - an aspect of Scottish history that is often neglected. Although the Battle of Killiecrankie had more lasting effect upon Scottish history, the victory at Dunkeld was far more significant - it played a pivotal role in ensuring religious freedom in Scotland.
BOB BUSER: Treasurer/Asst. Scribe
Phone: Home: (evenings) 021-689-1639
Office: (mornings) 021-689-9771
Email: bobbuser@webafrica.org.za
OR bob.sal@mweb.co.za
RAY HATTINGH: Secretary
Phone: 021-592-1279 (Office)
Email: ray@saarp.co.za